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Justice Potter Stewart on Racial




The effect of Justice Stewart's participation in constitutional deci-
sion-making on the Supreme Court has been particularly significant in
cases involving racial discrimination. The importance of Stewart's role
during the last two decades in determining the extent of the Constitu-
tion's mandate of racial equality might well have been prophesied at
the time of his appointment to the Court.' Indeed, his views on the
Constitution and racial equality were a central factor in the debate on
his confirmation.2
President Eisenhower nominated Justice Stewart to the Supreme
Court four years after it had unanimously decided in Brown v. Board of
Education3 that the Fourteenth Amendment proscribes state-imposed
racial segregation in schools. In the wake of the Brown decision, there
was concern about Stewart's position on the equal protection issue
raised by de jure racial segregation. Although his nomination was gen-
erally acceptable to northern pro-desegregationists, it aroused consider-
able opposition among the southern conservative establishment in the
Senate. Henry Abraham, in his analysis of the Stewart confirmation,
suggested that the conservative South viewed Stewart as a "sure vote
* Assistant Professor of Political Science, University of California, Santa Barbara;
B.A., 1967, City College of the City University of New York; M.A., 1969, University of
California, Los Angeles; Ph.D., 1977, University of California, Los Angeles.
1. Stewart was a recess appointment in October, 1958.
2. He was later confirmed by the Senate on May 5, 1959.
3. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). Although the Court had rendered earlier decisions in the area
of segregated education, e.g., McLaurin v. Oklahoma, 339 U.S. 637 (1950), Sweatt v.
Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950), Missouri v. Gaines, 305 U.S. 337 (1938), it is almost uniformly
agreed that the Brown I decision was the symbolic, if not practical, start of the role of the
federal courts in dismantling the labyrinth of southern segregation.
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for racial equality."4 Similarly, Murphy and Pritchett characterized the
hearings on Stewart's nomination as an attempt by southern senators to
hold "a debate on the merits of school desegregation."5 The wide-
spread assumption of Stewart's commitment to constitutionally-man-
dated racial equality led Senators Russell of Georgia and Eastland of
Mississippi to attempt to block the confirmation on the grounds that he
would contribute to what they saw as a wrong trend of the Court.6 The
racial segregation issue explains the final confirmation vote in the Sen-
ate of seventy to seventeen, a vote reflecting unanimous support with
the exception of Senator Holland of Florida and the entire Senate dele-
gations from Alabama, Arkansas, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi,
North Carolina, South Carolina and Virginia.7 The fear of Stewart's
reputed pro-civil rights stance suggests that his position on the highly
controversial issue was likely to make him a significant Court partici-
pant. It is therefore pertinent to inquire whether the fears of the south-
ern segregationists concerning the addition of Stewart to the Court
have been realized.
Although no cursory examination of Justice Stewart's record on
racial equality or any other subject is likely to reveal his true judicial
philosophy, a number of legal scholars have attempted to ascertain
whether he is more a "liberal" jurist than a "conservative" jurist." The
conclusions are by no means uniform, but most commentators have
4. H. ABRAHAM, JUSTICES AND PRESIDENTS 249 (1974) [hereinafter cited as ABRA-
HAM].
5. W. MURPHY & C.H. PRITCHETT, COURTS, JUDGES AND POLITICS 73 (1961).
6. ABRAHAM, supra note 4, at 250.
7. Id.
8. Throughout the text, unless otherwise noted, the label "liberal" is applied to Justices
prone to support individual liberties against allegations of governmental intrusion. Claims
for Bill of Rights and Thirteenth, Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendment protection of indi-
vidual freedom and equality are generally supported by this group. Liberals, however, are
not prone to find violations of individual liberties in governmental regulations of the econ-
omy; New Dealism is also part of the liberal creed. "Conservatives," in contrast, are those
who have been unlikely to see governmental actions as violations of individual rights or
have been easily persuaded by the government of the advisability of its restrictions on sub-
stantive and procedural rights. Conservatives, unlike liberals, are reluctant to read broadly
the meaning of constitutional rights or find additional implied or penumbral rights. This
conception of a liberal-conservative dichotomy with respect to the Court, with some minor
variation, has been adopted by contemporary analysts of the Supreme Court. See, e.g.,
ABRAHAM, supra note 4; S. GOLDMAN & T. JAHNIGE, THE FEDERAL COURTS AS A POLITI-
CAL SYSTEM (1971) (though declining to use the terms liberal and conservative in their anal-
ysis of data on Supreme Court voting blocs, they have delineated the same phenomenon in
the voting behavior of the Justices); D. ROHDE & H. SPAETH, SUPREME COURT DECISION
MAKING (1976); G. SCHUBERT, THE JUDICIAL MIND REVISITED: PSYCHOMETRIC ANALYSIS
OF SUPREME COURT IDEOLOGY (1974); R. SCIGLIANO, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE
PRESIDENT (1971); R. STEAMER, THE SUPREME COURT IN CRISIS (1971); Schubert, Judicial
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shared a common frustration in assessing Stewart and have settled for
rather vague conclusions. No one has sought to study Stewart's per-
formance in depth.9 The most comprehensive statement offered by
scholars about Stewart's performance as a Justice is that he has been a
"moderate." But what does it mean to be a moderate? To Schubert, it
is a reflection of one's voting behavior and perhaps voting coalitions;10
to Spaeth and Rohde, the term has a similar meaning." To conclude,
however, that Stewart is moderate because his vote swings" from pre-
sumed liberal to presumed conservative positions and because his vot-
ing alignments are the most fluid of all contemporary Justices I3 is to
capture only part of what moderation has meant with respect to Stew-
art.
Having a mixed voting record in support of the claims of racial
minorities is one aspect of Justice Stewart's moderation, but being the
centrist or middle member of the Court in racial discrimination cases
has had other manifestations. His pattern of voting, although mixed, is
neither inconsistent nor random; rather, it appears to be a function of
Stewart's adoption of a moderate theoretical approach to the resolution
of cases. Thus, it will be argued that when Stewart appears to have
shifted positions unpredictably in cases on school desegregation, state
action, or the interpretation of federal statutes (especially the Voting
Rights Act of 1965), he has in fact voted consistently because his ap-
proach to decision-making and his theoretical orientation have been
Attitudes and Voting Behavior: The 1961 Term f the Supreme Court, 28 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROB. 100-42 (1963).
9. Although little detailed attention has been paid to Stewart by legal scholars, there
has been a debate about where to place him on the ideological scale. Steamer has concluded
that Stewart has been more liberal than Justices Harlan and Whittaker. R. STEAMER, THE
SUPREME COURT IN CRISIS 262 (1971). Alternatively, Rodell has argued that Stewart is
more likely than not to be among the liberals. Rodell, It Is the Earl Warren Court, in THE
SUPREME COURT UNDER EARL WARREN 148 (L. Levy ed. 1972). Abraham takes a some-
what more tentative position in viewing Stewart as a "progressive-conservative or moder-
ately liberal." ABRAHAM, supra note 4, at 126. Other analysts, however, have concluded
that Stewart is definitely neither liberal nor conservative. See, e.g., Schubert, Judicial Atti-
tudes and Voting Behavior: The 1961 Term of the Supreme Court, 28 LAW AND CONTEMP.
PROB. 126 (1963). Similarly, Rohde and Spaeth have viewed Stewart as "neutral." D.
ROHDE & H. SPAETH, SUPREME COURT DECISION MAKING 144 (1976).
10. Schubert, supra note 8.
11. D. ROHDE & H. SPAETH, supra note 8.
12. The term "swing" voter is used to describe a Justice who on some occasions is sup-
portive of particular values and interests and on other occasions votes against similar claims.
13. For analyses of Stewart's voting alignment, see November issues of the Harvard
Law Review, 1959 through 1977. Stewart's voting behavior displays a uniquely high level of
independence. As measured over time, Stewart has been the least aligned of the contempo-
rary Justices.
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qualitatively different from those of either the liberal or conservative
wings of the Court. His voting pattern merely reflects his unique stan-
dards for resolving conflicts before the Court; standards which are not
as result-oriented, pro-civil rights as the liberals' nor as restrictive of
the judicial power to promote racial equality as those of the conserva-
tives.
Perhaps the most important element of Justice Stewart's approach
to the judicial function is his commitment to a narrow and deliberate
approach to constitutional decision-making. Stewart once commented
in a personal interview that "the law is a careful profession" and Jus-
tices as lawyers ought not to reach issues not necessarily before them.'4
His commitment to the Justice-as-lawyer model has influenced his ap-
proach to constitutional adjudication. He stands out among his con-
temporaries for his tendency to narrow the issue, decision, and remedy
in the racial equality cases he has decided. This narrow approach has,
in recent years, often led Stewart to cast the pivotal fifth vote in racial
equality cases.' 5 Thus, although the anti-desegregationists' assumption
that Stewart would contribute to the Court's "wrong course" was pre-
mature in anticipating that Stewart's vote would immediately alter the
course of Supreme Court decisions, it may be argued that with time
their fears have been at least partially realized.
In Part I of this article-Data Analysis-it will be shown that Jus-
tice Stewart has been considerably less supportive of civil rights than
has the Court as a whole. In Part II-Analysis of the Issues-it will
become clear that the numbers reflecting Stewart's voting record are
but a small part of his significant role in civil rights litigation. The
analysis of racial equality cases which appears in Part II has been di-
vided into four sections: (1) decisions based on the Constitution; (2)
cases in which the primary issue was the presence or absence of state
action; (3) decisions based on federal statutes; and (4) decisions involv-
ing racial equality in the electoral system.
I. Data Analysis
The data included in this article are derived from all of the cases
14. Oral interview with Justice Potter Stewart in Washington, D.C. (April 19, 1976).
15. The term "pivotal" is used to indicate that the vote securing a majority of the Court
was cast by the Justice least strongly associated with the substantive implications of a deci-
sion over which the other Justices are evenly divided. While one might argue that any Jus-
tice who votes with a Court decision which has only a one-vote majority is the pivotal vote,
through careful analysis of prior decision-making one can ascertain which Justice, if any, is
least closely associated with the decision. In situations in which the "fifth vote" is a narrow
concurring opinion, the identity of the pivotal Justice is obvious.
decided during the past twenty years in which racial equality was the
major issue. Although the selection of cases for analysis involved some
degree of judgment, since many of the decisions are arguably subject to
various classifications, in practice the difficulties were very few. In-
cluded in the analysis are all of the cases decided by the Court from the
time of Stewart's appointment in 1958 to July 197816 involving segrega-
tion along racial lines, racial discrimination in voting, denials of equal
opportunity because of race, as well as cases involving criminal prose-
cutions based on the race of the defendant. Most of the cases were
decided under the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment; others were treated by the Court as raising due process questions
or requiring interpretation of federal statutes designed to ensure racial
equality. Accordingly, the analysis of Justice Stewart's participation in
racial equality cases over a period of two decades is aimed at assessing
his role in the Court's protection of racial equality and is not limited to
assessing his role in the interpretation of the equal protection clause.
TABLE 1
Racial Equality Cases
Total decided 109 cases
Court pro-racial
equality decisions 77 cases 71% of total decided
Stewart pro-racial
equaltiy decisions 69 cases 63% of total decided
Average Justice* 71% pro-racial equality
Difference between average Justice and Stewart = 8%
* Average Justice is the mean of all votes cast in the relevant cases.
16. A note is in order here about the methodology used in the data analysis presented in
this paper. The votes of all of the Justices participating in the 109 racial equality cases
decided since 1958 have been compiled and analyzed on a case-by-case basis. It should be
noted that a "case" is conceived as involving a new principle, a new application, and a
situation that can be differentiated; thus, the data presented reflect no multiple counts of
what were essentially the same case. For example, the three "freedom of choice" plans for
desegregation of public schools rejected by the Supreme Court in 1968 were counted as only
one case; ie. Monroe v. Board of Comm'rs, 391 U.S. 450 (1968), Raney v. Board of Educ.,
391 U.S. 443 (1968), and Green v. County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430 (1968).
The Appendix specifies all of the cases analyzed within each of the categories. The
tables presented in the text display the level of support for racial equality in the voting
behavior of the Justices and in the decisions of the Court as a whole. Thus, each table shows
the total number of cases of a particular type decided by the Supreme Court during the last
20 years. Each table also shows the number (and percentage) of those cases in which Justice
Stewart cast a vote supportive of racial equality. The decisions of the Court (majority) as a
whole are similarly indicated. The term "average justice" refers to the average of all of the
votes cast by the Justices in the relevant cases. For example (as displayed in Table I), be-
tween 1958 and 1978, the Court decided 109 cases involving racial equality. In 77 of these
cases the Court decided in favor of the litigant advancing the racial equality claim. Stew-
Spring 1979] JUSTICE STEWART-RACIAL EQUALITY
HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY
Total decided
TABLE 1A
Non- Unanimous Racial Equality Cases
62 cases
Court pro-racial
equality decisions 34 cases 55% of total decided
Stewart pro-racial
equality decisions 23 cases 37% of total decided
Average Justice 54% pro-racial equality
Difference between average Justice and Stewart = 17%
TABLE 217




















































art's vote promoted racial equality in only 69 of these cases. A total of 952 judicial votes
were cast in the 109 cases; 672 of these votes were supportive of racial equality. Thus, the
theoretical average Justice, or more precisely, the average judicial vote, % as "liberal" on race
71% of the time.
17. Tables 2A, B and C, are from G. SCHUBERT, THE JUDICIAL MIND REVISITED: PSY-
CHOMETRIC ANALYSIS OF SUPREME COURT IDEOLOGY 163 (1974). Tables 2D, E and F were









Tables 1 and 2 both suggest that Justice Stewart has never been
among the vanguard of the Court in voting to support racial equality
under law. Table 2 shows Stewart to rank in the middle of the Court in
terms of his support for racial equality (tenth among eighteen Justices),
though, as Tables 2A-2F indicate, his relative position has varied over
time. Stewart ranked consistently in the bottom third of the Warren
Court in supporting decisions promoting racial equality. With the
changes in membership from the Warren to the Burger Courts, Stew-
art's rank within the Court on support for racial equality has risen to a
middle position. This change is due to the appointment of more con-
servative Justices to the Court and not to any significant shift in Stew-
art's approach in these cases. Chief Justice Burger and Justices Powell
and Rehnquist have been consistently less supportive of racial equality
than were their respective predecessors; Justice Blackmun's support for
racial equality has been similar to that of Stewart.
The data presented in Table 1 indicate that while the Court as an
institution has supported racial equality 71% of the time, Justice Stew-
art's support has been a full 8% lower. When compared to the theoreti-
cal average Justice-the mean or average vote cast in these cases-
Stewart is also 8% less supportive of equality. The differences between
Stewart and the Court as an institution become even more pronounced
when one examines voting behavior in only the non-unanimous racial
equality cases. As Table IA demonstrates, in cases where there has
been disagreement among the Justices as to whether the law could sus-
tain a finding of discrimination, Stewart has taken a pro-civil rights
stance only 37% of the time. Thus, while there was an 8% difference
between Stewart and the Court when all racial cases are considered, in
those engendering disagreement Stewart's support level is 18% lower
than that of the Court. Similarly, the difference between the average
Justice and Stewart increases from 8% in all racial cases decided to 17%
in non-unanimous cases.
Justice Stewart's low level of support for civil rights vis-a-vis the
Court as an institution is also suggested by the fact that he has never
dissented in support of civil rights. In two decades of rather intensive
civil rights litigation, there has not been even one occasion when Stew-
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art was more supportive of racial equality than a majority of the Court;
no case prompted Stewart to case a vote for civil rights which had not
so persuaded at least four other Justices. Stewart's rank on Tables 2A,
B and C of between six and 8.5 of the nine Justices indicates that dur-
ing the years of the Warren Court he would have been unlikely to be in
dissent when voting in support of racial equality. Similar data for the
Burger Court (Tables 2D, E and F) show that in recent years Stewart's
rank within the Court has been relatively higher in support of racial
equality; he has been at or near the center of the Court in aggregate
support. During the period between 1969 and 1975 (Tables 2D and E)
he often cast the pivotal fifth vote determining whether an otherwise
equally divided Court would support a particular litigant's position.
After the retirement of Justice Douglas and the appointment of
Justice Stevens in 1975, Justice Stewart's centrism has been increas-
ingly marked by his role as the most constant member of majority co-
alitions in a Court not prone to five-to-four divisions. In racial equality
cases decided during this period he has been in dissent but once, in
Castaneda v. Partida,'8 a record matched by no other contemporary
Justice. Since 1976, moreover, Justice Stewart has played an active role
in race cases. Of the thirty-seven decisions handed down by the Court
since Justice Stevens' appointment in 1975, nine were per curiam, with
the remaining twenty-eight attributable to individual Justices. Stewart
wrote for the Court in eleven of these signed opinions, a figure which
suggests both his importance as a contributor to the Court's decision-
making in this area and, perhaps, his moderating influence in the for-
mation of majority coalitions.' 9
TABLE 3
Constitutional Racial Equalio , Cases
Total decided 63 cases
Court pro-racial
equality decisions 41'cases 65% of total decided
Stewart pro-racial
equality decisions 35 cases 56% of total decided
Average Justice 66% pro-racial equality
Difference between average Justice and Stewart = 10%
18. 430 U.S. 482 (1977).
19. Stewart wrote the majority opinion in the following cases: Christiansburg Garment
Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 42 (1978); Hazelwood School Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299
(1977); Connor v. Finch, 431 U.S. 407 (1977); Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160 (1976);
Chandler v. Roudebush, 425 U.S. 840 (1976); Brown v. General Servs. Adm'n, 425 U.S. 820
(1976); NAACP v. Federal Power Comm'n, 425 U.S. 662 (1976); Francis v. Henderson, 425
U.S. 536 (1976); Hills v. Gautreaux, 425 U.S. 284 (1976); Beer v. United States, 425 U.S. 130
[Vol. 6:853
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TABLE 3A
Non- Unanimous Constitutional Racial Equality Cases
Total decided 37 cases
Court pro-racial
equality decisions 18 cases 49% of total decided
Stewart pro-racial
equality decisions 12 cases 32% of total decided
Average Justice 52% pro-racial equality
Difference between average Justice and Stewart = 20%
TABLE 4
Racial Equality Cases Based on Statute
20
Total decided 46 cases
Court pro-racial
equality decisions 36 cases 78% of total decided
Stewart pro-racial
equality decisions 34 cases 74% of total decided
Average Justice 76% pro-racial equality
Difference between average Justice and Stewart = 2%
TABLE 4A
Non- Unanimous Racial Equality Cases Based on Statute
Total decided 27 cases
Court pro-racial
equality decisions 16 cases 59% of total decided
Stewart pro-racial
equality decisions 15 cases 56% of total decided
Average Justice 57% pro-racial equality
Difference between average Justice and Stewart = 1%
Whereas Table 1 shows Justice Stewart's lower-than-average sup-
port for racial equality in all cases, Table 3 indicates that when consid-
ering only cases decided directly on the basis of constitutional
provisions, Stewart's support level relative to the Court declines even
(1976). The other 17 opinions for the Court were authored by the following Justices: Powell
(4), Rehnquist (4), Marshall (3), Brennan (2), White (2), Burger (1), and Blackmun (1).
20. These Tables (4 and 4A) include, inter alia, cases on racial discrimination in the
electoral system litigated under federal statutes. It should therefore be noted that Tables 4
and 4A include all of the cases listed in Appendix C and those cases listed in Appendix D
which were decided under federal statutory provisions. The inclusion of the statutory voting
cases does not significantly alter the data obtained without them, but it should be noted that
the substantive discussion in Part IIC (Racial Equality Under Statute) refers to federal laws
covering non-voting issues. Part IID (Racial Equality in the Electoral System) includes a
discussion of both the constitutional and statutory challenges to discrimination in voting.
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further. When Stewart's voting behavior in cases based on the Consti-
tution is compared with those based on statutory interpretation (Tables
3 and 4), however, it is clear that not only has he been much more
supportive of racial equality when Congress has previously acted (74%
compared to 56%), but he also comes much closer to the Court as a
whole in his support level with respect to both majority decisions and
the average Justice. The absence of unanimity on cases significantly
alters Stewart's relative place on the Court in constitutional cases (Ta-
bles 3 and 3A), but it is not influential in statutory cases (Tables 4 and
4A). In non-unanimous constitutional cases, Stewart falls 20% below
the average Justice (Table 3A), while in non-unanimous statutory cases
he is but 1% less supportive of racial equality than is the average Justice
(Table 4A). The absolute decline vis-a-vis the Court, as distinguished
from the relative decline, is also far more dramatic in the area of consti-
tutional law where, as Tables 3 and 3A demonstrate, Stewart falls from
support in 56% of the total cases to support in only 32% of cases en-
gendering dispute among the Justices. The implication to be drawn
from Tables 3, 3A, 4 and 4A is clear: Stewart has been much more
supportive of racial equality under statutes than under the Constitu-
tion, and while this is true of the Court as a whole, it is considerably
more pronounced with Stewart. Furthermore, in cases based on the
Constitution where dissenting votes were cast, Stewart is a very likely
candidate to have opposed a pro-racial equality decision. In contrast,
his support for racial equality in statutory cases is actually closer to that
of the Court in cases generating dissenting votes.
One explanation for the pattern of greater support for individual
rights under statute than under the Constitution is Justice Stewart's
general approach to decision-making on the Court, a topic which will
be explored further in Part IIC. Not only has he preferred to rest deci-
sions on statutory grounds where possible-as in Board of Regents of
the Universify of California v. Bakke2 1-but his reluctance to make de-
cisions which could be described as either too broad or too indelible
has led him to exhibit greater caution in constitutional cases than in
those involving the interpretation of statutes. Decisions supportive of
racial equality under the Constitution almost always require an act of
positive judicial review in which the Court denies state authorities the
power to discriminate against minorities on the basis of race. These
decisions restrict states' flexibility because change would require either
a constitutional amendment overruling the precedent or a new Court
21. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
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decision to the same effect. Thus, in constitutionally-based racial
equality cases which have engendered disagreement among the Jus-
tices, as measured by the casting of dissenting votes, Stewart has been
very unlikely to support a pro-racial equality result.
In contrast to his approach to constitutional adjudication, Justice
Stewart's greater apparent willingness to support claims for racial
equality under statute, even in cases where members of the Court disa-
gree, is, perhaps, a function of his greater comfort with decisions which
need not be as binding in the future. Though some Justices might be
very supportive of statutory protection of civil rights based on the belief
that Congress, and not the Court, possesses the greater responsibility
for protecting civil rights (through its legislative power under section 5
of the Fourteenth Amendment),22 in Stewart's case it is not clear that
deference to Congress has been a particularly important factor in his
decision-making. Stewart, in an oral interview as well as in many of
his written opinions, has conveyed the belief that there is a very limited
level of social knowledge upon which to base decisions. "No one," he
suggested, "is wise enough to see around the next corner"; whether one
is a citizen, a judge or a Congressman, the prudent course to follow is
therefore one which least restricts the future options for change.
23
In general, statutes are more easily changed than is the Constitu-
tion; decisions of great import reached through statutory interpretation
are less restrictive of future alternatives than are similarly broad consti-
tutional decisions. Through legislative amendment, Congress is free to
alter the course set by Supreme Court decisions which are based en-
tirely on federal statutes, whereas constitutional amendment involves a
considerably more arduous process. Thus, Stewart's belief in flexibility
for change has rendered him considerably more amenable to using stat-
utes to promote racial equality in ways he would not use the Constitu-
tion.
The quantitative data reviewed in this section suggest that Justice
Stewart, relative to the other Justices, has been only marginally sup-
portive of racial equality. Statistics, however, convey only one aspect
of his participation in the racial equality cases. The full significance of
Stewart's role in this area of constitutional and statutory litigation can
only be derived from an analysis of the issues raised by the cases, the
decisions and the remedies involved. Although the quantitative data
suggest the general outlines, detailed analysis of the cases involving the
22. U.S. CONST. AMEND. XIV, § 5 provides: "The Congress shall have power to en-
force, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article."
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Constitution and racial segregation, state action, racial equality under
statute and racial discrimination and the electoral system, all discussed
in Part II, leads to the conclusion that Stewart's importance stems more
from the narrow, centrist, often pivotal quality of the substance of his
opinions than from the mere fact of his vote in a particular decision.
II. Analysis of the Issues
A. The Constitution and Racial Segregation: School Desegregation
and Beyond
As has been noted,24 the issue of school desegregation was a key
factor accompanying Justice Stewart's elevation to the high Court.
Though it was assumed by southern Senators that he would contribute
to the further dismantling of the dual school system that the South
sought to preserve, his vote was not regarded as likely to result in a
shift in constitutional doctrine. The Court had already spoken on the
issue of desegregation, and the significant foundations for change had
been laid with unanimity. The three rudimentary but far-reaching
precedents of Brown 1,25 Brown 11,26 and Cooper v. Aaron27 had been
established, and there was no indication but that the Court would con-
tinue to rule accordingly on challenges to de jure racial segregation in
public education.
Prior to Justice Stewart's nomination to the Court, he was involved
in one of the first tests of the effectiveness of Brown II with respect to
lower court interpretation and application. In Clemons v. Board ofEdu-
cation offHillsboro,28 the Sixth Circuit was faced with a school district's
attempt to delay desegregation for two to three years until new school
buildings could be constructed. One judge in the Clemons case was
opposed to any delay in desegregation and another was unwilling to
enjoin delay. Circuit Judge Stewart believed that the desegregation
process should begin the following fall so as not to disrupt classes then
in progress. New students entering the school district prior to the fall,
however, were to be assigned without respect to race since no disrup-
tion in their school routine would thereby be occasioned. This middle
view of the proper course for school desegregation in Hillsboro pre-
vailed, resolving the dispute.
Justice Stewart's position in this case generated contradictory com-
24. See notes 1-5 and accompanying text supra.
25. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
26. Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
27. 358 U.S. 1 (1958).
28. 228 F.2d 853 (6th Cir. 1956).
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mentary on his philosophy concerning the role of the judiciary in en-
suring racial equality under the Constitution. Jerold Israel viewed his
vote in Clemons as proof of a strong commitment to the use of judicial
power to promote racial equality,29 while J. Francis Paschal cited the
case as evidence of Stewart's pragmatism and unwillingness to order
immediate desegregation without consideration of the facts and miti-
gating circumstances.3" These varying interpretations of Stewart's judi-
cial philosophy indicate that his approach was not entirely obvious
from a philosophical standpoint, even if his position in Clemons can
now be seen as a percursor to the centrist, pivotal position he was later
to play in Supreme Court school desegregation cases.
Reminiscent of Clemons was Justice Stewart's brief dissent from
the Supreme Court's summary reversal of Singleton v. Jackson Munici-
pal Separate School District.3" Stewart thought it appropriate for the
Supreme Court to defer to the findings and orders of the lower court on
the question of delay. He took the position that without a full hearing
on the facts of the case, the Court should have given greater deference
to the Fifth Circuit's postponement of school desegregation. Stewart,
while expressing no opinion on the merits of the case, has often chided
the Court for not hearing fuller arguments on various questions. In
Singleton, and possibly other cases, 32 Stewart seemed prepared to allow
desegregation to proceed at a slower pace, provided the record did not
suggest egregious abuse of discretion by the lower court.
In 1972, the Court's united front in fully considered school deseg-
regation cases came to an abrupt end in Wright v. Emporia.33 That
Justice Stewart's participation was pivotal in this case seems evident
not only because he wrote the five-to-four majority opinion, but also
from the content of the narrowly-drawn, situationally-based opinion.
At issue was whether the City of Emporia, Virginia, could withdraw
from an educational contract with Greensville County and operate its
own school district, thereby removing itself from the federal court de-
segregation plan for Greensville County. Stewart rejected the circuit
court's reliance on the "dominant purpose test" and reinstated the dis-
trict court's injunction against the operation of a new school district, on
the grounds that the splintering of Emporia into a separate district
29. Israel, Potter Stewart, in THE JUSTICES OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT:
THEIR LIVES AND MAJOR OPINIONS 2923 (F. Israel & L. Friedman eds. 1969).
30. Paschal, Mr. Justice Stewart on the Court of4ppeals, DUKE L.J., 328-29 (1959).
31. 396 U.S. 290 (1970). Stewart also registered a dissenting vote from the Court's sum-
mary reversal in Sweet Briar Institute v. Button, 387 U.S. 423 (1967).
32. See note 31 supra.
33. 407 U.S. 451 (1972).
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would have the effect of impeding school desegregation in Greensville
County. In rejecting the circuit court's approach, he stated:
This "dominant purpose" test finds no precedent in our deci-
sions. . . . Though the purpose of the new school districts was
found to be discriminatory in many. . . cases, the courts' hold-
ings rested not on motivation or purpose, but on the erect of the
action upon the dismantling of the dual school systems involved.
That was the focus of the District Court in this case, and we hold
that its approach was proper.
34
Relying heavily on statistical data for Greensville County (the
withdrawal of Emporia would have had the effect of reducing the white
school population from 34% to 28%), Justice Stewart nevertheless
stressed that a combination of circumstances contributed to the finding
that Emporia's attempt to establish an independent school district was
a violation of the equal protection clause. In addition to the statistical
factors, other relevant considerations included the timing of the city's
decision to withdraw from Greensville County schools-shortly after
the final desegregation order-the fact that the originally all-white and
better-equipped schools were located within the City of Emporia, as
well as the intangible effect of loss of community support on the
chances for a successful desegregation plan. The opinion closed by re-
iterating that the holding was limited to cases where creation of a new
school district would impede the process of dismantling a dual sys-
tem.35 Rather than striking down the practice of splintering wherever
there was school segregation, (whether or not the district was under a
direct desegregation order), Justice Stewart relied on the existence of
such an order in Greenville County, thereby limiting the decision's im-
pact. Such reliance on factual context highlights his tendency not to
write an opinion any more broadly than necessary to dispose of the
actual case before the Court.
Although Justice Stewart's opinion in Emporia is perhaps more
limited than Justices Douglas, Brennan, Marshall or White might have
preferred, it is significant in that the effect on desegregation generated
by the division of a school district was found to be only minimal (in
this case 6%) and yet was held to be constitutionally proscribed. The
dissenting opinion, written by Chief Justice Burger36 , applied the same
"effect" test and concluded that the effect of the change proposed in
Emporia was de minimis. The majority interpretation of the "effect" of
34. Id. at 461-62 (emphasis in original).
35. Id. at 470.
36. Id. at 475-76 (Burger, C.J., dissenting, joined by Blackmun, PoA ell and Rehnquist,
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a 6% change in white enrollment suggested that there was little room
for similar maneuvers by school districts in the future.
The significance of municipal school district boundary lines in de-
segregation cases, important in Emporia and the companion case of
United States v. Scotland Neck Board of Education,3 took on an added
dimension in Milliken v. Bradley.38 In this challenge to a district court's
insistence on a metropolitan plan for desegregating the Detroit city
schools, the State of Michigan argued successfully that the lower court
had exceeded its discretion and equitable powers. While Justice Stew-
art's position in the Emporia case was implicitly that of the fifth vote, in
Milliken his concurrence, which explicitly constituted the fifth vote, left
no doubt as to his desire to narrow or limit the majority's nearly total
rejection of the "metro" remedy. The opinion by Chief Justice Burger
stressed the tradition of local control of education in America, the prac-
tical difficulties of merging fifty-four school districts into one, as well as
the presumed "innocence" of the suburban districts-hence the injus-
tice of including them within a desegregation plan.39 The Court's opin-
ion would allow for an inter-district remedy only upon a finding of
either an interdistrict cause of segregation or an intentional drawing of
segregative district boundary lines. Stewart, however, left open the
possibility of allowing a metro remedy if state officials had contributed
to the segregation situation through boundary drawing, school transfer
policies, or "purposeful, racially discriminatory use of state housing or
zoning laws."40 The dissenters, in contrast, thought the metro remedy
appropriate because it was deemed necessary to effectuate the equal
protection rights of the Detroit students. It was, for the dissenters, irrel-
evant that the suburban districts were not themselves defendants in the
law suit.
The sanctity of local government boundaries is one of the key
37. 407 U.S. 484 (1972). The situation in Scotland Neck, North Carolina was quite
similar to that in Emporia, except that an act of the state legislature was required to give
Scotland Neck the authority to have an independent school district. Despite the great simi-
larity between the two cases, in Scotland Neck Chief Justice Burger concurred with the
Court opinion because he saw the splinter district as creating a practical impediment to
school desegregation. 407 U.S. at 491 (Burger, C.J., concurring, joined by Blackmun, Powell
and Rehnquist, JJ.).
38. 418 U.S. 717 (1974). While it may be argued that the Court had already spoken on
this issue in School Board of Richmond v. State Board of Education of Virginia, 412 U.S. 92
(1973) (a§f'dper curiam), the Court there provided no insight into the precise factors which
were relevant in this four-to-four decision. Also, Milliken may be distinguishable because of
the flexibility of Michigan school district boundaries and greater power of state government
to control educational policies statewide, factors not present in the Richmond situation.
39. 418 U.S. 717, 742-45 (1974).
40. Id. at 755 (Stewart, J., concurring).
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questions in effectuating school desegregation. 4' Justice Stewart's am-
bivalence toward this question has created a curious situation in which
there is a lack of predictability as to precisely when the federal courts
may order cross-district assignments as means of desegregating school
districts where the existing segregation is attributable at least in part to
the actions of public officials. As the only vote change between Empo-
ria and Milliken, Stewart secured the majority of five in each case. His
Milliken concurrence suggested that that case could be distinguished
from Emporia.42 Perhaps a key consideration was the lack of interest
in achieving district autonomy displayed by the City of Emporia until
it was faced with a desegregation order; there was no pre-existing oper-
ative school district boundary that had to be respected.43 Rather than
district boundary inaction where the consolidation of districts might
promote desegregation as in Milliken, the Emporia situation was one of
purposive action to operate a new district. In addition, the Greensville
County district, of which Emporia was a part, had previously promoted
segregation.44 Stewart suggested that, in contrast, there was an absence
of any segregationist "guilt" in the Wayne County, Michigan sub-
urbs.45 While this factor, if the central one, 6 would be relatively easily
and predictably applied by taking note of historical evidence as the
Court did in Emporia, it was not the major consideration in Stewart's
concurrence. A more significant element in Stewart's opinion, and the
one creating a basis for future unpredictability, was his willingness to
open a constitutional Pandora's box and consider the contribution of
state housing and zoning policies to segregation as between city and
suburb.47 Thus, while in Milliken Stewart's position was in the middle
since the dissenters were more willing to accept metropolitan plans as a
practical measure to accomplish desegregation, in fact this middle posi-
tion has far-reaching implications. Not only has Stewart appeared to
adopt Justice Douglas' view that the state can cause segregation in the
schools through very subtle demographic manipulations, 4 but he has
also not precluded the possibility that a metro plan could eventually be
41. For a discussion of this issue, see Binion, Racial Discrimination /v Alteration or Re-
fusal to Alter School District Boundaries, 54 U. DET. J. URB. L. 811 (1977).
42. 418 U.S. 717, 755 (Stewart, J., concurring).
43. 407 U.S. at 455-57.
44. Id. at 455.
45. 418 U.S. at 757 (Stewart, J., concurring).
46. The absence of segregationist history in Michigan appears to have been given sub-
stantial weight by the majority opinion. See id. at 748-49.
47. Id. at 755 (Stewart, J., concurring).
48. See, e.g., Douglas' dissent from summary affirmance in Spencer v. Kugler, 404 U.S.
1027 (1972). The major difference between Stewart and Douglas on this point would seem
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reinstated in Detroit if evidence were introduced showing such involve-
ment of state officials. Although Stewart's contribution in Milliken was
to create a situation of unpredictability by issuing a multifaceted opin-
ion, he has subsequently proven to be supportive of interdistrict reme-
dies when state or federal officials have created boundaries which result
in segregation.49
Since Milliken, Justice Stewart's centrism has been marked by his
consistent support of decisions restricting judicial discretion to order
large-scale desegregation plans. These decisions, however, have been
tentative rulings in which desegregation orders in Austin,
5" Dayton,51
Omaha 52 and Milwaukee53 were reversed and remanded for reconsid-
eration in light of the racially-discriminatory purpose required in
Washington v. Davis5 4 and the underlying principle in Milliken that the
"punishment"-a desegregation plan-should not exceed the extent of
the "crime, of purposeful segregation. Thus, Stewart appeared to alter
his course in school desegregation cases when he concurred in Davis as
to the necessity of proving clear intent to discriminate in constitutional
cases.55 A key factor, perhaps, in his support for the majority position
in the progeny of Davis is the narrowness of these opinions.56
Beyond School Desegregation
Just as the foundation for school desegregation had been laid
before Justice Stewart's arrival on the Court, so also were there equal
protection proscriptions of state-mandated racial segregation in other
publicly-run institutions and accommodations. On the basis of Brown
to be Douglas' assumption that segregationist intent is ordinarily the case, while Stewart was
merely willing to entertain evidence on the subject.
49. Stewart's position in Milliken allowed him to vote to uphold cross-district desegre-
gation in the Wilmington, Delaware case, Buchanan v. Evans, 423 U.S. 963 (1975). Also
relevant in his opinion for the Court in Hills v. Gautreaux, 425 U.S. 284 (1976), in which he
supported an extra-jurisdictional remedy in a housing discrimination case against HUD and
the Chicago Housing Authority.
50. Austin Independent School Dist. v. United States, 429 U.S. 990 (1976).
51. Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 433 U.S. 406 (1977).
52. School Dist. of Omaha v. United States, 433 U.S. 667 (1977) (per curiam).
53. Brennan v. Armstrong, 433 U.S. 672 (1977) (per curiam).
54. 426 U.S. 229 (1976). Davis held that the racially disproportionate impact of a gov-
ernment practice, neutral on its face, did not render the practice unconstitutional absent a
finding of discriminatory purpose.
55. See notes 33-34 and accompanying text supra.
56. See, e.g., Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977) and
notes 50-53 and accompanying text supra. It should be noted that Stewart's concurring
opinion in Davis was more limited than that of the majority, written by Justice White, since
Stewart did not join in the portion which considered whether Title VII of the 1964 Civil
Rights Act had been violated.
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I, the Court in 1955 ordered desegregation of state-run recreational
facilities in a number of cases receiving only summary consideration."
Various other aspects of state-mandated racial separation, however, re-
mained in force.
In most of these cases, Justice Stewart's role has been that of one
vote in unanimous condemnation of racially-segregative state policies.
Thus, for example, in Watson v. Memphis,5 8Johnson v. Virginia59 and
Lee v. Washington,60 he voted with a unanimous Court ordering deseg-
regation of public parks, courtrooms and prisons, respectively. Never-
theless there was still some evidence of Stewart's measured approach to
constitutional equality. In Lee v. Washington, though agreeing with the
Court that racial segregation in prisons violated equal protection, he
joined Justice Black's concurrence, which suggested that under certain
circumstances racial separation could be a legitimate policy. In emer-
gency situations, for example, Alabama could, in good faith, "consider
racial tensions" in maintaining prison security.6' In a sense one could
argue that the concurrence did not really depart from the majority posi-
tion in Lee in that it considered factors other than those raised in the
case. The departure, however, is inherent in the suggestion that there
may be circumstances in which the Court's blanket proscription would
be inappropriate.
Bearing a resemblance to Justice Stewart's position in Lee is his
opinion for the Court in Carter v. Jury Commission of Greene Coun/y,
Alabama,62 which illustrates his commitment to the principle of the
limited remedy. Carter challenged Alabama jury selection statutes re-
quiring "honest repute" and "good character" for jury service. These
requirements gave jury selection commissions sufficient discretion to
keep blacks off jury rolls. 63 Despite the gross disparity between the
percentage of black population in the county and the percentage of
blacks on the jury rolls,' Stewart stopped short of either declaring the
jury selection statute unconstitutional or ordering the governor to put
57. See, e.g., Mayor and City of Baltimore v. Dawson, 350 U.S. 877 1955) (per curiam)
and Muir v. Louisville Park Theatrical Ass'n, 347 U.S. 971 (1954) (per turiam).
58. 373 U.S. 526 (1963).
59. 373 U.S. 61 (1963) (per curiam).
60. 390 U.S. 333 (1968) (per curam).
61. Id. at 334. (Black, J., concurring, joined by Stewart and Harlan. JJ.).
62. 396 U.S. 320 (1970).
63. Id. at 322-23.
64. In 1960 blacks constituted 75% of the population but only 7% of the jury rolls. In
1964 a federal district court enjoined the commission from discriminating on the basis of
race. In 1967 blacks constituted 65% of the population but only 32% of the jury rolls. 396
U.S. at 327-28 (1970).
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blacks on the jury selection commission. He noted that the require-
ments were not unusual:
Statutory provisions such as those found in [section] 21 are not
peculiar to Alabama, or to any particular region of the country.
Nearly every State requires that its jurors be citizens of the
United States, residents of the locality, of a specified minimum
age, and able to understand English. Many of the States require
that jurors be of "good character" or the like; some, that they be
"intelligent" or "well informed."65
The Court upheld the district court remedy of enjoining the Commis-
sion from discriminating against blacks in the future.66 Carter may
represent Stewart's commitment to a federalism in which states retain
maximum authority. Although federalism appears to be a very secon-
dary consideration for Stewart in most cases where the balance had
already been struck against state autonomy, such as in school desegre-
gation, there are strains suggesting that Stewart has been reluctant to
order state and local authorities to perform any positive action solely
on the basis of prima facie evidence. In the Carter case this orientation
was shared by all but Justice Douglas, who would have invalidated the
entire jury selection system.67
Not entirely unrelated to Justice Stewart's stance in Carter was his
position in Mayor of Philadelthia v. Educational Equality League,68 a
challenge to the racially exclusive appointment practices of the mayor
of Philadelphia. It was alleged that the mayor's failure to appoint
blacks to the school board nominating panel proportionate to the black
school population constituted prima facie evidence of unconstitutional
racial discrimination. The Court denied an injunction against the
Mayor, evidencing its unwillingness to interfere with the day-to-day
operations of local government. Although in Carter the issue was
whether to grant a writ of mandamus or an injunction, in Mayor of
Philadelihia the choice was between an injunction or no remedy at all.
In this five-to-four decision it would be a fair assumption that Stewart
was the critical fifth vote because the four Nixon appointees with whom
he joined 9 had been consistently less likely than he to use federal judi-
cial power to effect racial desegregation.70 The four dissenters, alterna-
tively, suggested that the Court should show greater deference to the
65. Id. at 333 (citations omitted).
66. Id. at 336-37.
67. Id. at 345 (Douglas, J., dissenting in part).
68. 415 U.S. 605 (1974).
69. Chief Justice Burger and Justices Powell, Rehnquist and Blackmun.
70. See Tables 2D, E and F supra.
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findings of fact in the circuit court.7" Recalling Stewart's dissent in Sin-
gleton,72 where he recommended such deference to a lower court deci-
sion which slowed desegregation, it would seem, in racial equality
cases, that his deference should be interpreted as directed toward the
narrower, more limited remedy, or to the denial of a remedy rather
than toward preserving lower courts' factual assessments.
Given Justice Stewart's commitment to judicial restraint, an unex-
plained departure from his consistently narrow opinions in racial segre-
gation cases is particularly interesting. This departure from the limited
opinion principle occurred in McLaughlin v. Florida73 in 1964 and has
proven to be an important harbinger of the position Stewart was later
to take in Bakke. The ultimate in segregation laws was challenged in
McLaughlin and Loving v. Virginia,74 where the states imposed crimi-
nal sanctions on interracial cohabitation and marriage, respectively.
Justice White for the majority in McLaughlin suggested that a criminal
law focusing on the race of the actor is difficult to sustain under the
equal protection clause, stating that "[s]uch classifications bear a far
heavier burden of justification. 75 He concluded, "In short, it has not
been shown that section 798.05 is a necessary adjunct to the State's ban
on interracial marriage. We accordingly invalidate section 798.05 with-
out expressing any views about the State's prohibition on interracial
marriages, and reverse these convictions. '76 Despite the fact that Jus-
tice White's opinion bears the mark of the limited, non-anticipatory
Stewart opinion, Stewart's concurrence went considerably further:
But the court implies that a criminal law of the kind here in-
volved might be constitutionally valid if a state could show
"some overriding statutory purpose." This is an implication in
which I cannot join, because I cannot-conceive of a valid legisla-
tive purpose under our Constitution for a state law which makes
the color of a person's skin the test of whether his conduct is a
criminal offense. . . . Discrimination of that kind is invidiousper
se.
7 7
Stewart's position would dispose of all criminal cases in which a racial
element is involved; race would be an impermissible classification in
71. 415 U.S. at 647-48 (White, J., dissenting, joined by Brennan, Marshall, and Doug-
las, JJ.).
72. See note 31 and accompanying text supra.
73. 379 U.S. 184 (1964).
74. 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
75. 379 U.S. 184, 194 (1964). Although Justice White did not speak of suspect classifi-
cation, this aspect of the McLaughlin opinion differs in import from Chief Justice Warren's
in Loving only in that White did not use the word "suspect."
76. Id. at 196.
77. Id. at 198.
criminal law. As this would obviously include criminally punishable
interracial marriage, Stewart could concur in Loving merely be refer-
ring to his McLaughlin opinion.7" The explanation for this unexpect-
edly broad position may well lie in Stewart's commitment to the
doctrine proffered by the senior Justice Harlan that the Constitution is
color-blind.7 9 In an oral interview Stewart suggested that "[d]espite
Professor Shockley to the contrary, under the Constitution black and
white are identical."80 The Florida and Virginia laws challenged in
McLaughlin and Loving, respectively, were perhaps too overt as racial
classifications to be sustainable under any circumstances. Thus, Stew-
art may have wished to foreclose such a possibility.
Justice Stewart, as well as Justice White, spoke only of the crimi-
nal law in McLaughlin; at that time it was not affirmative action or
benign quotas he sought to preclude. One might argue, however, that
Stewart's philosophy of color blindness, dispositive of McLaughlin and
Loving, was also the foundation for his position in the Bakke case. As
discussed in section C of part II of this article, in joining Justice Ste-
vens's partial dissent in Bakke, Stewart extended the dictum of his Mc-
Laughlin concurrence from the criminal to the civil law, from
constitutional to statutory proscription, and from a classification dis-
advantaging minorities to one arguably disadvantageous to Cauca-
sians. Thus, his concurrence in McLaughlin, although broader than
was necessary to resolve that case, did not of itself preordain his posi-
tion in Bakke. With an appreciation of Stewart's commitment to the
legal identity of black and white, however, one may understand the
principle underlying his McLaughlin and Loving concurrences, as well
as their extension to his position in Bakke.
B. The State Action Requirement
Whether particular discriminatory activity is attributable to state
action, and as such, prohibited by the equal protection clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, has been one of the key problems confronting
the Supreme Court in a generation of intensive civil rights litigation.
While there were some foundations for determining when state action
had in fact occurred where no state or local law mandated racial dis-
crimination, there were few guiding principles for Supreme Court deci-
sion-making during the civil rights revolution of the 1960's. Several
prior decisions had generated state action ideas such as: administrative
78. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (Stewart, J., concurring).
79. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
80. See note 14 supra.
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action is state action;8" official activity violative of state law is state ac-
tion;8 2 political parties in a primary are state action;8 3 streets in a com-
pany town serve a public function, hence company action is state
action;8 4 and the use of the judicial process to interfere with otherwise
willing sellers and buyers is state action. These precedents existed
prior to Stewart's appointment to the Court, but the real tone of the
state action doctrine was set by Burton v. Wilmington Parking Author-
it y86 in 1961.
In Burton the Court spoke of "sifting facts and weighing circum-
stances" '87 in order to determine when there is sufficient state involve-
ment in allegedly private denials of equal treatment to blacks to render
the discrimination constitutionally proscribed. Finding that the Eagle
Coffee Shoppe had forfeited its freedom to discriminate when it en-
tered into particular leasing arrangements with the state, the Court sug-
gested that the mutual benefits derived from the relationship between
the coffee shop and the State of Delaware tipped the balance in favor of
government responsibility.
Justice Stewart's concurring opinion was significantly narrower
than Justice Clark's opinion for the Court, despite the latter's reliance
on the combination of various circumstances. Whereas the Court sifted
and weighed to determine state involvement, Stewart viewed the state
action element as arising from the Delaware court's interpretation of a
statute allowing refusal of service to anyone "offensive to the major
part of the customers."88 Since there was no evidence that Burton was
offensive, the use of that statute by the judge to justify Eagle's decision
to expel him, according to Stewart, was discriminatory state action.
Stewart saw the state court interpretation of the statute "as authorizing
discriminatory classification based exclusively on color. Such a law
seems to me clearly violative of the Fourteenth Amendment."8 9 What
made Stewart's position especially narrow was the limited remedy
available under his approach to the state action issue. In viewing the
Delaware statute as unconstitutional if interpreted to authorize dis-
crimination, Stewart could vote to overturn the instant conviction for
81. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
82. Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91 (1945).
83. Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944).
84. Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946).
85. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
86. 365 U.S. 715 (1961).
87. Id. at 722.
88. Id. at 726-27 (Stewart, J., concurring).
89. Id.
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trespass, but his opinion could in no way justify an injunction against
the coffee shop's future discrimination. All that Delaware and other
states would need to do to avoid a finding of state action would be to
refrain from using statutes as authorization for proprietors' racial dis-
crimination.
The Court's behavior in the state action area since Burton may
fairly be characterized as tentative-carefully attempting to avoid ob-
literating the distinction between public and private action while at the
same time not denying relief to blacks who have in fact suffered from
racial discrimination. The situationally-based, ambiguous approach of
sifting and weighing in this fashion may explain the large number of
dissenting votes cast in decisions in this area.
TABLE 5
Court Unanimity on Racial Equality Cases
By Type of Issue Involved
Total # of # unanimous percentage
Cases unanimous
A. Racial Segregation and
the Constitution 43 18 42%
B. State Action 13 3 23%
C. Racial Equality Under
Statute 28 16 57%
D. Racial Equality and the
Franchise 25 10 40%
Table 5 demonstrates that the issue of state action has produced the
lowest degree of unanimity and thus the lowest degree of consensus
within the Court of any of the racial equality problems. Multi-factor,
non-specific guidelines by their nature invite disagreement as to their
applicability. Cases in which the key issue was the appropriate consti-
tutional standard for state policies involving racial separation or exclu-
sion were decided unanimously 42% of the time. Similarly, cases in the
areas of interpretation or construction of federal statutes (excluding
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Voting Rights Act cases),9" as well as those involving the constitutional
and statutory protection of the black elective franchise, produced una-
nimity rates of 57% and 40%, respectively. In contrast, only 23%, or
fewer than one in four, of the state action cases were decided by a
unanimous Court. Even in the three cases which were unanimous deci-
sions, there was no unanimous opinion for the Court. Thus, while Pe-
terson v. City of Greenville,9 Gilmore v. City of Montgomery92 and
Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co.93 generated no votes against a finding of
state action, these were concurring or partially dissenting opinions in
which different arguments from those of the Court were advanced. It is
therefore a justifiable preliminary conclusion that one of the most diffi-
cult areas for the Court has been the determination of precisely when
the threshold state action requirement of the Fourteenth Amendment
has been met.
Since the Burger Court has shifted away from a perception of state
action in many cases,94 it may be argued that Justice Stewart is the
pivotal vote when a disagreement arises over this issue. The Court may
be viewed as dividing into three blocs with relatively greater or lesser
standards for finding state action. The liberals, including, at various
times, Justices Douglas, Warren, Brennan, White (generally),
Goldberg, Fortas and Marshall, took the approach that any indication
of state endorsement, support or subtle encouragement of discrimina-
tion infected the allegedly private discrimination with official responsi-
bility.95 On the conservative wing of the Court, there were, and are,
Justices espousing the view that state action requires a showing that
government officials were likely to have caused the discriminatory acts
against blacks which, save for the involvement of the state, would prob-
ably not have occurred.96 This bloc usually included Justices Harlan,
Frankfurter, Whittaker and Black (toward the end of his term), and
later Chief Justice Burger and Justices Blackmun, Powell and Rehn-
quist. Between these qualitatively different conceptions of state action
are Justices Stewart and Clark, whose votes on state action cases have
generally been less predictable. This does not imply that their votes
90. For purposes of this analysis, statutory voting rights cases are included in the cate-
gory "Racial Equality and the Electoral System."
91. 373 U.S. 244 (1963). Peterson was the basis for a finding of state action in Robinson
v. Florida, 378 U.S. 153 (1964).
92. 417 U.S. 556 (1974).
93. 398 U.S. 144 (1970).
94. See, e.g., Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507 (1976); Moose Lodge v. Irvis, 407 U.S.
163 (1972).
95. See, e.g., notes 109-11 and accompanying text infra.
96. See, e.g., note 102 and accompanying text infra.
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were random; rather, their votes reflected the view that the state action
requirement is met whenever it is shown that official actions could have
caused the resulting discrimination against blacks. Therefore, unlike
the liberals, these moderates have not thought it sufficient to show that
the state subtly encouraged discrimination; but conversely, they have
rejected the conservatives' requirement of proof that the state's involve-
ment was a more likely cause of the discrimination than was the per-
sonal decision of a private citizen. The judicial divisions in the sit-in
cases of Peterson and Lombard v. Louisiana97 serve to illustrate the
point, especially when contrasted with, for example, Evans v. Newton
98
or Reitman v. Mulkey.99
In the sit-in cases, the Court was faced with trespass convictions of
blacks arising out of the civil rights movement. In each of these deci-
sions, rendered prior to the enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
the Court found the measure of official involvement in the decision to
evict blacks from lunch counters sufficient to render the racially-moti-
vated orders to leave, as well as the subsequent trespass convictions,
violative of equal protection. In Peterson and Robinson v. Florida'00
the continued existence of a city ordinance and state regulation, respec-
tively, encouraging racial segregation in restaurant facilities was
viewed by the Court as sufficient evidence of state action. The Court in
Robinson concluded that "the State through its regulations has become
involved to such a significant extent in bringing about restaurant segre-
gation that appellants' trespass convictions must be held to reflect that
State policy and therefore to violate the Fourteenth Amendment."''
Justices Stewart and Clark voted with the Court, presumably because
the existence of a state regulation or city ordinance supporting segrega-
tion could cause the decision to expel blacks. Justice Harlan, on the
other hand, was able to concur in Peterson only because the private
perpetrator of discrimination referred during the trespass trial to the
existence of the ordinance as grounds for his decision to refuse to serve
blacks. 0 12 Harlan's condition that it must be likely that the state's ac-
tion, not the individual's private decision, was the proximate cause of
the discrimination was thus met. If it was clear that the individual
would have discriminated even if no ordinance existed, then Harlan
would refuse to treat the discriminatory conduct as state action. Simi-
97. 373 U.S. 267 (1963).
98. 382 U.S. 296 (1966).
99. 387 U.S. 369 (1967).
100. 378 U.S. 153 (1964). See note 91 supra.
101. 378 U.S. at 156-57.
102. Peterson v. Greenville, 373 U.S. at 253 (Harlan, J., concurring).
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larly, in Lombard v. Louisiana,113 the Court, joined by Justice Stewart,
maintained that the statements of public officials, including the mayor
and police chief, supported segregation by suggesting that blacks
should be expelled from white lunch counters, and that the merchants'
expulsion of blacks therefore constituted state action. The decision was
in keeping with the outlook attributed to Stewart that the official ac-
tions could have prompted private citizens to take a hard line against
desegregation. Justice Harlan, however, dissented because he did not
think it likely that the decision to expel was due to comments of public
officials, in the absence of which the discrimination would not have
occurred."m  Unlike Peterson, the record in Lombard did not suggest
that the merchants had specifically obeyed the recommendations of the
city fathers.
As noted, Justice Stewart joined the majority of the Court in the
sit-in cases, where there was the possibility that discrimination would
not have occurred save for the actions of governmental personnel. This
conception of state action, however, caused him to dissent in those
cases where the Court relied on subtle official endorsement or encour-
agement of privately-made decisions as its basis for a finding of state
action. Thus, while the majority in Evans v. Newton"0 5 spoke of the
public function served by parks, Justice Stewart, in joining Justice
Harlan's dissent, endorsed the idea that the Fourteenth Amendment
could not frustrate a private will once the state was no longer involved
in the administration of the estate. The park in question had been be-
queathed to Macon, Georgia by Senator Bacon with the proviso that it
be used by whites only. The majority of the Court ruled that the city's
attempt to withdraw from official control of the park (in order to allow
it to remain segregated) did not divest the park of its public character;,
the state therefore bore official responsibility for the continuing dis-
crimination."°6 The dissent contended that it was not possible for the
city to have caused the discrimination; the city was simply effecting the
terms of a totally private decision contained in the will."0 7 Similarly,
Stewart constituted the theoretical fifth vote against a finding of state
action in Palmer v. Thompson,° 8 where the facts could support the con-
clusion that it was not possible for the state to cause segregation in the
103. 373 U.S. 267 (1963).
104. Justice Harlan's dissent in Lombard appears in his opinion concerning a group of
segregation decisions. Peterson v. Greenville, 373 U.S. at 254 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
105. 382 U.S. 296 (1966).
106. Id. at 301-02.
107. Id. at 316-17 (Harlan, J., dissenting, joined by Stewart, J.).
108. 403 U.S. 217 (1971).
once public swimming pools which it no longer controlled. Just as the
decision to segregate the park in Evans was a private one, so also was
the decision to segregate privately-owned pools which had been
purchased from the government in Palmer.
Once again, in Reitman v. Mulkey, °9 Justice Stewart joined a
Harlan dissent against the Court's view that California's Proposition 14
was unconstitutional state action. The Court viewed the repeal of the
Unruh and Rumford open housing laws through a statewide voter initi-
ative as subtle encouragement by government of those who would deny
housing to blacks based on racial bias. According to the dissenters, the
State of California had chosen to remain neutral with respect to hous-
ing discrimination; 0 it was therefore neither the proximate nor a pos-
sible perpetrator of discrimination which might result from the state
constitutional amendment under review.
The Court's process of sifting and weighing state action questions
did not create a serious unpredictability as to the decisions that were
likely to be made during the Warren Court era. Given the commit-
ment of the liberals to a very broad notion of state action, and their
relative dominance on the Court on civil rights issues, it was to be ex-
pected that their sifting and weighing was likely to yield a decision dis-
cerning official support for allegedly private acts of discrimination.
What was not entirely predictable was the substance of the argument,
the particular facts of the case that would be deemed to have consti-
tuted the requisite official involvement. That the thread needed to be
only gossamer during the 1960's is evidenced by the fact that of the
eight differentiable racial discrimination state action cases decided dur-
ing the Warren years, in only one case did the Court not attempt to
remedy fully a state action. I l '
The one departure, in 1960, was a five-to-four decision in which
the Court opinion was authored by Justice Stewart. In Wofe v. North
Carolina, 2 a decision based on procedural grounds, Stewart held that
a state court need not consider as definitive in a criminal case a federal
civil court finding of state responsibility for discrimination by its les-
sees. Refusing to bar a trespass conviction on the rationale that the
state had power under the Constitution to set its own rules of evidence
109. 387 U.S. 369 (1967).
110. Id. at 389 (Harlan, I., dissenting, joined by Black, Clark and Stewart, JJ.).
111. See Appendix B. Of the first eight cases listed therein, relief was denied only in
Wolfe v. North Carolina, 364 U.S. 177 (1960), a Stewart opinion decided on procedural
grounds.
112. 364 U.S. 177 (1960).
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and review, he deferred consideration of the trespass statute and its
applicability under the Constitution.1 3 Thus, while the possibility of
Supreme Court reversals of trespass convictions involving state com-
plicity in segregation was not precluded by Stewart in Wolfe, his vote
with the majority in the Peterson, Robinson,n 4 Lombard"5 and Gron
v. Maryland 1 6 decisions could not have been predicted with any cer-
tainty on a reading of Wofe.
The opinions which Justice Stewart joined in the sit-in cases were
based narrowly on the record of involvement of public officials. They
carefully avoided the broader constitutional issue of state responsibility
for public accommodations which are licensed, inspected, and in vari-
ous other ways controlled by state and local government. Moose Lodge
v. Irvis, 7 however, unavoidably decided the issue of whether state li-
quor licensure clothes a private club with public officialdom, resulting
in state action. Although the Court answered the state action question
in the negative and reversed the district court's decree that Moose
Lodge's liquor license was invalid, it found that state enforcement of
the lodge's discriminatory policy would violate the Fourteenth Amend-
ment."18 Later, in Gilmore v. City of Montgomery, I 9 a unanimous deci-
sion denying exclusive use of public recreational facilities to segregated
schools, Stewart was the theoretical fifth vote for the Court's narrow
approach to the issue. The four liberals' partial concurrences were
more prone to consider and restrict even non-exclusive use by segrega-
tionist groups.' 20 Justice Blackmun's opinion for the Court, in which
Stewart joined, held that the lower court, on remand, "by sifting facts
and weighing circumstances" should determine if non-exclusive use vi-
olated the equal protection clause.' 2' Although it is arguable that non-
113. Id.
114. See notes 91, 100-02 and accompanying text supra.
115. See notes 103-04 and accompanying text supra.
116. 378 U.S. 130 (1964) (employee of private park who was also a deputy sheriff acted
under color of state law in enforcing racially discriminatory policy).
117. 407 U.S. 163 (1972).
118. The state of Pennsylvania required clubs granted liquor licenses to observe all of
their charter provisions and regulations. In the case of the Moose Lodge, this included their
"white only" membership and guest policy. Justice Rehnquist, who wrote the Court's opin-
ion, therefore concluded that Pennsylvania might be partially responsible for the actual en-
forcement of the racially exclusive policy, and might properly be enjoined from such
activity. Thus the state sanctions would be unavailable to aid Moose Lodge in enforcing the
policy, but the Lodge could retain its license as well as its discriminatory policy. Id. at 177-
79.
119. 417 U.S. 556 (1974).
120. Id. at 576.
121. Id. at 574-75.
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exclusive use would fail to correct the constitutional infirmity of dis-
criminatory state action which existed with exclusive use,122 Stewart's
predeliction not to decide any more than was necessarily before him
may explain his vote with the four Nixon appointees.
Justice Stewart's moderate approach, which has involved narrow-
ing the question, the decision, and the remedy, has characterized his
participation in the state action cases just as it has marked his approach
to racial segregation issues in general. His voting in these cases appears
to be less predictable than that of the other members of the Court in
that he swings from voting with liberals to joining the conservatives in
the key cases on state action. This pattern is the result of his espousal
of a middle theoretical position on the conditions necessary to find state
responsibility for allegedly private acts of discrimination.
C. Racial Equality Under Statute
The third category of racial equality cases generating a sizable vol-
ume of litigation during the past twenty years has been the interpreta-
tion and application of federal statutes protecting individual civil
rights. In contrast with the adjudication of state action cases, the inter-
pretation of federal statutes has occasioned considerably less discord
among the Justices. As Table 5 indicates, cases involving the constitu-
tionality of state segregation and the cases on racial discrimination in
voting produced unanimity 42% and 40% of the time, respectively,
while state action decisions resulted in a low unanimity rate of 23%. Of
the statutory construction cases, more than half-57%--produced no
dissents. 123 As was suggested by Tables 3 and 4,124 the Court as an
institution has been more likely to render pro-civil rights decisions on
statutory grounds than on constitutional grounds. It was also noted
that this pattern was considerably more pronounced with Justice Stew-
art's performance than it was with the behavior of the Court as a whole
or with the hypothetical average Justice.
That the Court as a whole should be more supportive of individual
rights based on statute than on the Constitution directly is not surpris-
ing. Any Justice who is philosophically committed to judicial restraint
would hesitate to exercise judicial review and declare laws and prac-
tices of state or local governments unconstitutional. While this ten-
122. This point was emphasized in the concurring opinions. See id. at 576-77 (Marshall,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); id. at 581-82 (White, J., concurring, joined by
Douglas, J.).
123. See Table 5, Part IIB, supra.
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dency was often overcome by the momentum of Brown and the ensuing
desegregation cases, in later cases the Court has shown greater reluc-
tance to exercise positive judicial review. In statutory cases, however, a
commitment to restraint is no barrier; no decision of constitutional
magnitude is involved in a vote supportive of racial equality under stat-
ute. In the case of Justice Stewart specifically, his 18% higher support
rate on statutory cases than on racial equality cases decided under the
Constitution"' is arguably attributable to his slow, one step at a time,
approach.
When dealing with constitutional issues, any decision is relatively
indelible, theoretically requiring the arduous task of constitutional
amendment to alter the judicial pronouncement. Alternatively, when
statutes are construed, a different result can be reached by mere legisla-
tive revision. The assessment of Justice Stewart's voting pattern as re-
flecting caution would certainly seem reasonable given his general
reluctance to preclude future alternatives in constitutional cases. His
more liberal votes in statutory cases, however, are not necessarily a
function of deference to Congress since deference can be the basis for
decisions non-supportive of equality if statutes are interpreted to that
effect. While Stewart, when authoring an opinion supportive of indi-
vidual rights, often referred to the task at hand as solely that of carry-
ing out congressional intentions,'26 he has likewise been prone to rest a
non-supportive position on the same argument. His dissent in Hamm v.
Rock Hill27 indicated his view that congressional silence in the Civil
Rights Act of 1964128 on abatement of prosecutions of civil rights
protesters, leaving state abatement laws to govern the issue, was evi-
dence that Congress did not intend to abate. Similarly, writing for the
Court in City of Greenwood v. Peacock,129 Stewart rejected a broad
reading of provisions for removal of state prosecutions involving civil
rights to federal courts.' 30 He reasoned that Congress intended re-
moval to federal court of state prosecutions for activity covered by the
Civil Rights Act of 1964,11' but did not intend removal of all prosecu-
125. Justice Stewart supported racial equality under statute in 74% of the cases and racial
equality in 56% of the constitutional interpretation cases. See Tables 3 & 4, Part I, supra.
126. See, e.g., Albemarle v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 415-17 (1975), Love v. Pullman, 404
U.S. 522, 525 (1972), Georgia v. Rachel, 384 U.S. 780, 786 (1966).
127. 379 U.S. 306, 326-27 (1964) (Stewart, J., dissenting). Justices Harlan and White also
filed separate dissents.
128. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a-2000a-6 (1976).
129. 384 U.S. 808 (1966).
130. 28 U.S.C. § 1443 (1976).
131. Such activity would include that undertaken by federal officers and persons assist-
ing such officers in performing their duties under federal law providing for civil rights. 28
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tions of private civil rights workers. As Stewart's opinions in Hamm
and Greenwood indicate, his deference to Congress does not of itself
explain his relatively high level of support for individual rights under
federal statutory law. The task of statutory construction and applica-
tion involves, for the most part, a decision as to congressional inten-
tions but does not of itself ensure a liberal result.
In contrast with the constitutional and state action issues discussed
above, Justice Stewart's vote in statutory cases has rarely been pivotal.
There has been little dissent in the latter cases, and only three were
decided by five-to-four votes.' 32 Although not a pivotal vote in statu-
tory construction cases, Stewart's moderate approach to these questions
may nonetheless be discerned. With only a few exceptions the statu-
tory cases have not evoked significant philosophical or theoretical pro-
nouncements, given the nature of the task, but there are still three
positions which may be identified.
The conservative approach in statutory construction cases con-
sisted of questioning whether Congress had the constitutional authority
to regulate or prohibit the behavior covered by the statutes. In this
category, at various times, were Justices Black and Harlan-the former
with respect to the abuse of the interstate commerce power and the
latter with respect to his staunch rejection of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment bases for legislation absent clear state action. 133 In contrast, the
liberals questioned only whether the situation giving rise to the case
was actually covered by the statute as written by Congress. 134 Stewart,
U.S.C. § 1443(2) (1976). Also covered by removal statutes were specific rights granted by
preemptive federal statutes, such as the right to violate state trespass laws under certain
conditions. 28 U.S.C. 1443(l); Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(a) and 2000a-2(c)
(1976), construed in Hamm v. City of Rock Hill, 379 U.S. 306 (1964). See City of Green-
wood v. Peacock, 384 U.S. at 824, 826.
132. City of Greenwood v. Peacock, 384 U.S. 808 (1966); Hamm v. City of Rock Hill,
379 U.S. 306 (1964). Stewart dissented in Hamm and wrote the Court's opinion in Green-
wood. The third case decided by an almost evenly divided Court was Regents of the Uni-
versity of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978). In Bakke the pivot of the Court was
Justice Powell, in that he had the support of a different group of four Justices for each of the
two main points of the Court's opinion. The significance of Stewart's vote in Bakke, how-
ever, lies in the fact that he was the only Warren Court carry-over to vote against support for
the interests of racial minorities.
133. See, e.g., Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 107 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring);
Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, 396 U.S. 229, 241-57 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting); Daniel
v. Paul, 395 U.S. 298, 309-15 (1969) (Black, J., dissenting); Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co.,
392 U.S. 409, 449-50 (1968) (Harlan, J., dissenting); United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745,
762-74 (1966) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
134. See, e.g., Hamm v. City of Rock Hill, 397 U.S. 306,310 (1964); id. at 317 (Douglas,
J., concurring, joined by Goldberg, J.); City of Greenwood v. Peacock, 384 U.S. 808, 844
(1966) (Douglas, J., dissenting, joined by Warren, C.J., Brennan and Fortas, JJ.)
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like the liberals, saw the issue as one of the applicability of statutes to
facts rather than of whether Congress had the authority to reach the
behavior in question. However, his somewhat more rigorous analysis
of the applicability of statutes than was generally undertaken by the
more liberal members of the Court evidenced a middle course, one in
which he has been joined variably by Justices White and Harlan.
135
What is interesting and enlightening about Justice Stewart's statu-
tory interpretation opinions is that, as a rule, his close analysis of the
applicability of statutes failed to protect the individual only in situa-
tions where this deprivation would not be final. 136 Stewart's opinions
were thus limited in the sense that in the four cases in which he voted
against relief, these denials of a remedy, practically speaking, were only
tentative. In Hamm v. Rock Hill, 37 Stewart refused to assume a con-
gressional intent to abate prosecutions for breach of the peace and tres-
pass before the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The position
taken in his dissent, however, would not have precluded future relief
for the civil rights protestors. There were left open at least two pos-
sibilities: (1) the South Carolina courts might, on remand, find their
own abatement laws applicable; and (2) a habeas corpus proceeding
could be brought in federal court on due process grounds that there
was no evidence of actual illegal activity on the part of the protesters.
Similarly, in City of Greenwood v. Peacock, 38 Stewart's opinion for a
majority of five distinguished the case on a technicality from Georgia v.
Rachel139 in which removal was upheld. 1" Justice Stewart's finding in
135. See, e.g., notes 127-31 and accompanying text supra.
136. International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977), was
the only statutory case involving race discrimination in which Stewart voted, in effect, to
preclude the possibility of ultimate vindication of the rights of those in, olved. Although one
would not define Stewart's position in that Title VII suit as entirely anti-civil rights, some of
the workers whose interests were at stake in the case were left without a federal remedy.
Stewart wrote in broad terms of the reach and remedies possible under Title VII, including
the possibility of retroactive grants of seniority for those who were victims of discrimination
in employment. What Stewart refused to uphold was the position of the Department of
Justice (the plaintiff in Teamsters) that remedies should be granted to those who suffered
discrimination prior to the passage of the law in 1964. Thus, while many workers would
nevertheless be eligible for relief on the theory that the discrimination continued after the
passage of the Act, for those who had suffered discrimination only prior to that time, federal
remedies were effectively precluded.
137. 379 U.S. 306 (1964). See notes 127-28 supra.
138. 384 U.S. 808 (1966). See notes 129-31 and accompanying text supra.
139. 384 U.S. 780 (1966).
140. Rachel involved a criminal prosecution for trespass based solely on the race of de-
fendants. While the prosecutions were pending, the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was passed,
precluding state prosecution for peaceful attempts to be served in establishments on an
equal basis. Since the Rachel defendants' acts were covered by the statute, Stewart reasoned
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Greenwood that the removal statute was inapplicable did not preclude
ultimate relief. Neither Rachel nor Peacock had yet gone to trial. Per-
haps the Peacock defendants would be acquitted; if not, there was al-
ways the possibility of a federal habeas corpus remedy.
In Johnson v. Railway Express Agency,' 4 Justice Stewart joined
Justice Blackmun's opinion for the Court holding that the filing of an
employment discrimination suit under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964142 did not toll the one year statute of limitations on a section
198 1 14 1 suit based on the same discrimination. Although the Court
barred the suit for damages under section 1981, the possibility of a rem-
edy under the Title VII action remained. Finally, in Furnco Construc-
tion Corp. v. Waters,'" although Stewart voted against the interests of
black construction workers in a Title VII dispute, the decision did not
reach the ultimate question of discrimination under Title VII. Rather,
the Court held that a prima facie case of discriminatory refusal to hire
was not to be confused with a finding of fact on that issue for purposes
of Title VII relief. The case was then remanded to the lower court for
trial on the merits of the discrimination claim.
What is clear in three of the four cases involving Justice Stewart's
refusal to grant relief is that only somewhat tortured constructions of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 in Hamm and Johnson, and of section
1443 in Peacock, could have permitted the remedies sought. While the
liberals found it possible to read the law to give the requested remedy,
Stewart, arguably, was moved to see the setback to civil rights as only
temporary. If it seemed possible that further litigation of the cases
would ultimately produce a result compatible with racial justice, Stew-
art apparently believed it preferable not to stretch statutory interpreta-
that the mere pendency of the prosecutions could enable federal courts to predict that the
defendants would be denied rights conferred by the Act, thus making the removal statute
applicable. 384 U.S. at 793-94, 803-04, construing, respectively, the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
42 U.S.C. §§ 201(a), 203, 2000a, 2000a-2, and 28 U.S.C. § 1443(1) (1976). Peacock, on the
other hand, involved a claim that the defendants' right of free expression under the First
Amendment would be violated by their prosecution for obstructing the public streets of
Greenwood during demonstrations. Since the First Amendment claim did not fall within
the scope of "equal civil rights" as provided in § 1443(1), Stewart concluded that the re-
moval statute did not apply. 384 U.S. at 824-25.
141. 421 U.S. 454 (1975).
142. Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-6(a).
143. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1976): "All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States
shall have the same right in every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts, to sue,
be parties, give evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the
security of persons and property as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be subject to like
punishment, pains, penalties, taxes, licenses, and exactions of every kind, and to no other."
144. 438 U.S. 567 (1978).
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tion, thus maintaining the Court's credibility. It is in this sense that
Stewart represented a middle course within the Court. While his opin-
ions never discussed the issues in quite these terms, it is significant that
in these four cases his lack of support for civil rights involved situations
in which there was the potential of rectification in the future.
It may be inferred that Justice Stewart's commitment to using the
Court's resources to promote racial equality through statutory interpre-
tation, which is considerably less indelible than constitutional construc-
tion, has been nearly as strong as that of the liberal wing of the Warren
Court. The one recurrent difference has been Stewart's commitment to
do so with the least possible alteration of constitutional standards or
the least strained construction of statutes to reach the politically or le-
gally desired result. In cases like Love v. Pullman,45 Albermarle Paper
Co. v. Moody,146 Christianburg Garment Co. v. EEOC14' and Chandler v.
Roudebush,148 where liberal readings of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
and the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972 provisions were
plausible, Stewart spoke in rather broad language of the courts fashion-
ing remedies to give full effect to the goals and purposes of the Acts.
149
Analogously, in Griffn v. Breckenridge,150 by viewing section 198551 as
based on the Thirteenth Amendment, Stewart foreclosed the argument
that conspiracies to interfere with the right of interstate travel must be
entered into under color of state law to merit relief. Thus, the statute
could be applied broadly to the conduct of private individuals.
145. 404 U.S. 522 (1972).
146. 422 U.S. 405 (1975).
147. 434 U.S. 412 (1978).
148. 425 U.S. 840 (1976).
149. It should be noted, however, that in another Title VII case, International Union of
Electrical Workers v. Robbins & Myers, 429 U.S. 229 (1976), Stewart also evidenced his
commitment to the limited decision principle by declining to reach the question of whether
the pursuit of union grievance procedures tolls the running of time limits under Title VII.
Although narrowness has not been as critical a value for Stewart in statutory cases, the
majority in JUEW had already settled the case in favor of the appellants by applying the
extended time limits under Title VII. Stewart, in a concurring opinion, thought it unneces-
sary, therefore, to reach the tolling question.
150. 403 U.S. 88 (1971).
151. 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (1964): "If two or more persons in any State or Territory con-
spire or go in disguise on the highway or on the premises of another, for the purpose of
depriving. . . any person or class of persons of the equal protection of the laws, or of equal
privileges and immunities under the laws. . . in any case of conspiracy set forth in this
section, if one or more persons engaged therein do, or cause to be done, any act in further-
ance of the object of such conspiracy, whereby another is injured in his person or property,
or deprived of having and exercising any right or privilege of a citizen of the United States,
the party so injured or deprived may have an action for the recovery of damages, occasioned
by such injury or deprivation, against any one or more of the conspirators."
In situations, however, where the Court had a choice between rely-
ing on a questionable application of statute or upon a broadened inter-
pretation of constitutional protections to effect a pro-equality result,
Justice Stewart opted for the former. Three key cases exemplifying this
point are United States v. Guest, '5 Jones v. Afred H. Mayer Co." 3 and
Runyon v. McCrary.'54 In the Guest case, Stewart, for the Court, held
sustainable an indictment based on section 241,111 alleging conspiracies
to violate the right to travel freely from state to state and to intimidate
black citizens in the free and equal exercise of their rights. Though
rejecting the defendants' contention that section 241 applied only to
rights protected by laws of the United States against infringement by
private individuals, and not to rights protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment, Stewart stressed that application of section 241 to Four-
teenth Amendment rights was possible only because the indictment
contained allegations of state action. 156 Stewart was thus willing to
read section 241 as covering rights which are protected against state
infringement, such as Fourteenth Amendment rights, provided state in-
volvement could be shown. The Guest opinion also stated that the
right to travel interstate was fundamental to the Union and that Con-
gress had the power to legislate against impingements of that right.157
Congress may protect federally secured rights from invasion by private
individuals, but where the Constitution guarantees a right against in-
fringement by the state, Congress cannot enact legislation punishing
private interference with the right. 5 Stewart indicated that the right
to travel interstate was protectable by Congress against private interfer-
152. 383 U.S. 745 (1966).
153. 392 U.S. 409 (1968).
154. 427 U.S. 160 (1976).
155. 18 U.S.C. § 241 (1968) provides: "If two or more persons conspire to injure, op-
press, threaten, or intimidate any citizen in the free exercise or enjoyment of any right or
privilege secured to him by the Constitution or laws of the United States, or because of his
having so exercised the same; or
If two or more persons go in disguise on the highway, or on the premises of another,
with intent to prevent or hinder his free exercise or enjoyment of any right or privilege so
secured-
They shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than ten years, or
both; and if death results, they shall be subject to imprisonment for any term of years or for
life."
156. 383 U.S. at 754-56.
157. Id. at 758.
158. United States v. Williams, 341 U.S. 70, 77 (1951). A prime example of such a se-
cured right is the right to vote in congressional elections, a right which arises from the rela-
tionship between an individual and the federal government as compared to the right to trial
by jury in a criminal case which is protected only against governmental, not private infringe-
ment. .d.
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ence, suggesting that this right is federally secured.15 9 The major thrust
of Guest lay in its incorporation of Fourteenth Amendment rights into
those protected by section 241. Through this statutory construction de-
vice, the Court could sustain the federal indictment without an ex-
panded interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment.' The majority
approach was criticized by Justice Clark for its failure to suggest that
Congress had the power to protect citizens from private infringement of
Fourteenth Amendment rights,1 6 1 and by Justice Brennan who thought
that Congress already had done so.162 Stewart's opinion, therefore,
represented the narrowest way to reach the desired result.
Similarly, in Jones v. A/fred R. Mayer Co., 163 where petitioners
sought relief under section 198214 for respondents' refusal on racially-
discriminatory grounds to sell them a home, the Court had three alter-
natives: (1) to deny any relief under federal law; (2) to view the actions
of the Alfred H. Mayer Co. as state action, thus triggering Fourteenth
Amendment protections; or (3) to interpret section 1982 as applicable
to private discrimination in the sale of housing. As has been suggested,
Justice Stewart has evidenced a commitment to ensuring ultimate racial
justice when it was possible to do so without a constitutionally-based
decision. It is, therefore, not surprising that he would choose statutory
construction as preferable to either denying the possibility of a remedy
to Jones or granting a remedy at the cost of expanding the state action
doctrine under the Fourteenth Amendment. Stewart's opinion looked
to the Thirteenth Amendment, 165 which is not limited to conduct in-
159. This characterization of the right to travel was criticized by Justice Harlan. 383 U.S.
at 763-74 (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
160. It should also be noted that the penalties provided by § 241, see note 155 supra, are
heavier than those provided by § 242 which explicitly protects rights which are "protected"
or "secured." Section 242 provides only for a fine of up to $1,000 or imprisonment of not
more than one year, or both, where the violation does not result in the victim's death. 18
U.S.C. § 242 (1976). Thus, Stewart's interpretation permits the imposition of a greater pen-
alty for abridgement of a protected constitutional right than would be possible under § 242,
as well as avoiding the "under color of state law" requirement of § 242.
161. 383 U.S. at 761-62 (Clark, J., concurring joined by Black and Fortas, JJ.).
162. Id. at 777 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part, joined by Warren,
C.J., and Douglas, J.).
163. 392 U.S. 409 (1968).
164. 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1976) provides: "All citizens of the United States shall have the
same right, in every State and Territory, as is enjoyed by white citizens thereof to inherit,
purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal property."
165. The Thirteenth Amendment provides: "Section 1. Neither slaN ery nor involuntary
servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly con-
victed, shall exist within the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction. Section
2. Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation."
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volving state action, as the basis for section 1982.166 By tracing section
1982 to Thirteenth Amendment roots, the Court could find that Con-
gress had the power to determine what constituted a "badge or inci-
dence of slavery" and to pass appropriate legislation. The ultimate
question in Jones, as framed in Stewart's opinion, gives an indication
of the broad scope of the decision: "The constitutional question in this
case, therefore, comes to this: Does the authority of Congress to en-
force the Thirteenth Amendment 'by appropriate legislation' include
the power to eliminate all racial barriers to the acquisition of real and
personal property? We think the answer to that question is plainly
yes."' 167 Jones, therefore, was no short step; the implications of a sec-
tion 1982 right against private, as well as public entities, with the at-
tendant prospect of a judicially defined remedy are yet to be fully
realized.1 68  Given Justice Stewart's reluctance to take long constitu-
tional steps, however, especially if they require expanding doctrines of
state action, the Jones opinion was understandable because it was
based on a statute.
Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park Inc. 169 went on to apply Jones to a
refusal to approve the assignment of membership shares in recreational
facilities at a housing development to blacks, thus demonstrating the
broad applicability of section 1982. Again relying on Thirteenth
Amendment underpinnings in Runyon v. McCrary,17 ° Justice Stewart
applied section 1981171 to reach racial discrimination in private schools.
His opinion for the Court made no attempt to narrow its applicability
or potential import; it was not really possible to do so.' 72 If this deci-
sion were based on the Constitution, it would have been highly un-
166. 392 U.S. at 437-43.
167. Id. at 439.
168. Jones infused § 1982 with new force. Previously, similar deprivations of rights
found redress only in § 1983, which requires a showing of state action. 42 U.S.C. § 1983
(1976).
169. 396 U.S. 229 (1969).
170. 427 U.S. 160 (1976). Runyon involved private schools practicing racial exclusion.
The Court, per Stewart, held that § 1981 was violated because it declares that race shall not
be the basis for refusals to contract. Given that the Court had held in Jones that § 1982 did
not pertain only to state action, it may have been expected that § 1981 would be interpreted
in a similar manner. As in Jones, Stewart's opinion for the Court in Runyon interpreted
federal statutory law broadly.
171. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1976). See note 143 supra.
172. Justice Stewart did, however, note several issues which the case did not present,
involving other possibly excludable categories of students. This suggested that race might
be, in combination with religion, a permissible basis for exclusion. The explicit excision of
such categories from Runyon's interpretation of § 1981 may be further evidence of Stewart's
customary narrowing of the issue. 427 U.S. at 167-68.
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characteristic. But it was a statutory decision, and no matter what the
necessary breadth of the opinion, it was by nature tentative, statutes
being more easily changed than are constitutional pronouncements.
Even in Regents of the University of Calfornia v. Bakke,' 73 Justice
Stewart, in joining Justice Stevens' opinion which favored the interests
of a white medical school aspirant, took the position which avoided
constitutional interpretation.' 74 In this sense, he aligned himself with
what might be viewed as the middle course. He could have voted to
reverse the California Supreme Court ruling which had found the Uni-
versity's affirmative action plan unconstitutional.17 5 This approach
would have denied Bakke relief, perhaps not the just result in Stewart's
view. Alternatively, Justice Stewart could have joined Justice Powell in
finding that the University of California violated Bakke's Fourteenth
Amendment rights by excluding him from consideration on the basis of
his race, the quota system being unnecessary to further the compelling
interest in achieving a diverse student body. 176 He chose instead to join
the partial dissent in which Bakke was granted relief through interpre-
tation of the scope of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. In lan-
guage reminiscent of many of Justice Stewart's past opinions, Justice
Stevens asserted, "Our settled practice. . . is to avoid the decision of a
constitutional issue if a case can be fairly decided on a statutory
ground."'177 He then pointed out that because the University received
federal funds, its affirmative action program was subject to Title VI
prohibitions. Title VI provides: "No person in the United States shall,
on the ground of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from par-
ticipation in, be denied the benefits of; or be subjected to discrimination
under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assist-
ance." 78 Justice Stevens' reading of the statutory language led him to
conclude that Title VI prohibits exclusion of any group, including
whites, from federally-funded programs solely on the basis of race.
179
There are two problems with this analysis. First, it was not shown
that Congress intended to cover discrimination against non-minority
173. 438 U.S. 265, 408 (1978).
174. Id. at 411-21 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part, joined by Bur-
ger, C.J., Stewart and Rehnquist, JJ.)._
175. 18 Cal. 3d 34, 553 P.2d 1152, 132 Cal. Rptr. 680 (1977), aftdinpart and rev'd in part,
438 U.S. 265 (1978).
176. 438 U.S. at 287-320.
177. Id. at 411 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part, joined by Burger,
C.J., Stewart and Rehnquist, JJ.).
178. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1976).
179. 438 U.S. at 411 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part, joined by
Burger, C.J., Stewart and Rehnquist, JJ.).
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group members under Title VI. Justice Stevens, in examining legisla-
tive intent, relied upon repeated assurances during the House and
Senate floor debates that the Act would be color-blind in its applica-
tion 80 as authority for his view that the broad language of the Act
should be given its "natural meaning."' 1  Somewhat more convinc-
ingly, the Brennan opinion delineated the purpose of Title VI as ex-
pressed in the debates: "to eradicate a very specific evil: federal
financial support of programs which disadvantaged Negroes by exclud-
ing them from participation or providing them with separate facili-
ties." ' 2 Second, it was not conclusively shown that Bakke's race was
the basis for his exclusion from the school. When the burden of prov-
ing that Bakke would not have been admitted to the medical school
even in the absence of the special admissions program was placed on
the University, the University conceded it could not meet that bur-
den. '3 Thus, the issue was never fully litigated. Conceivably, even
though Bakke met the threshold requirements for consideration, he
might have been passed over for admission in favor of other qualified
candidates.'84 As in the Guest and Jones cases, Stewart's position in
Bakke involves an interpretation of federal law and congressional in-
tent which is not entirely persuasive. It must be remembered, however,
that it is only a question arising under Title VI which was reached in
Justice Stevens' opinion, and not the scope of a constitutional protec-
tion. Congress, theoretically, might rewrite Title VI.
Justice Stewart's decision-making under civil rights statutes is
marked both by his continued separation from the liberal and con-
servative blocs on the Court as well as by some departures from his
apparent standards for constitutional exegesis. While continuing to
show a commitment to the limited opinion principle, and exhibiting
some reluctance to "torture" federal statutes, particularly when a de-
sired result may be reached without resort to such tactics, he is, never-
theless, far more likely to "stretch" the purview of a federal statute than
to develop new constitutional doctrine.
180. Id. a, 414-15.
181. Id. at 418.
182. Id. at 334 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part, joined by White,
Marshall and Blackmun, JJ.).
183. Id. at 280.
184. This point is evidenced by the trial court's finding that Bakke had not shown that he
would have been admitted in the absence of a special admission program. As Justice Tobri-
ner noted, other preferences acknowledged by the school, such as regional preferences,
might have also operated to preclude Bakke's admission. 18 Cal. 3d 34, 86, 553 P.2d 1152,
1188, 132 Cal. Rptr. 680, 716 (1978) (Tobriner, J., dissenting).
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D. Racial Equality and the Electoral System
It has been suggested thus far that Justice Stewart has not been in
the vanguard of support for racial equality, at least where such support
would require expanding concepts of constitutional protection. Ironi-
cally, it is in voting equality cases, where Stewart has shown rather
strong support for equality-72% pro-racial equality,185 that he has dis-
played the greatest ambivalence about using judicial authority to pro-
mote equal voting rights. The ambivalence is probably due to
Stewart's commitment to federalism and the greatest possible auton-
omy for the states. This commitment has not seriously affected his ap-
proach to non-electoral racial equality cases because, unlike voting
cases, they seldom involve judicial interference with an inherent gov-
ernmental function--conducting elections. Thus, while Stewart's ap-
proach to voting equality cases bears his characteristic mark of narrow
decision-making, the influence of his federalist philosophy is unmistak-
able. In the development from the Warren to the Burger Courts of case
law involving racial equality in the electoral system, Stewart went from
being one vote in a series of unanimous decisions to being the pivotal
fifth vote determining the Court's decision in a series of cases interpret-
ing the Voting Rights Act of 1965. It is only with a full appreciation of
both his narrow approach to decision-making and his federalist philos-
ophy that one could have predicted his role in the Voting Rights Act
decisions.
The development of case law on racial discrimination in voting
includes three eras of decision-making during the Warren and Burger
Courts. The first era, from 1958 to 1965, was marked by a series of
unanimous decisions in which the Court in all cases except Lassiter v.
Northampton Election Board'86 found violations of Fourteenth and Fif-
teenth Amendment provisions in obvious state schemes to prevent
blacks from voting. Thus, in Gomillion v. Lightfoot,1"7 a unanimous
Court invalidated the redrawing of the city boundaries of Tuskegee
which had eliminated from the city all but four of its black voters. The
only point of contention within the Court was whether the decision
should properly be based on the Fourteenth or the Fifteenth Amend-
ment. Then in United States v. Mississippi'l8 and Louisiana v. United
185. While this datum is not displayed in table format, the 72% figure is derived from
Stewart's votes in cases listed under Appendix D (Racial Equality and the Electoral System).
186. 360 U.S. 45 (1959).
187. 364 U.S. 339 (1960).
188. 380 U.S. 128 (1965).
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States,189 the Court found Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendment vio-
lations in state-mandated "constitutional interpretation" tests used to
qualify voters. The Lassiter decision, the one exception to this trend,
was limited in that the Court found that it could not hold literacy tests
unconstitutional on their face.19° The Court left open the possibility of
finding unconstitutional on equal protection or Fifteenth Amendment
grounds literacy tests or other discriminatory voter qualification mech-
anisms.191 In the Mississippi and Louisiana litigation, the discretion
accorded registrars to administer constitutional interpretation tests and
to adjudge voting competency on the results raised the specter of dis-
criminatory misuse sufficient to overcome the Court's normal presump-
tion of state authority over the franchise.1 92 Justice Stewart's vote with
the Court in these cases is not difficult to understand. There was no
explanation for the states' actions except their desire to discriminate on
the basis of race. Given that the autonomy of the state over the con-
duct of elections does not extend to the denial of Fourteenth Amend-
ment rights, the autonomy principle could not justify such a
discriminatory effect.
The second era of racial equality in voting decisions was marked
by dissension within the Court. This turning point in constitutional
decision-making occurred during 1966 and involved challenges to the
Virginia state poll tax' 93 and to Congress' authority to enact the Voting
Rights Act of 1965.194 It is in these cases that Justice Stewart began to
show his ambivalence toward the role of the Court in promoting equal
access to the franchise for blacks. The root of Stewart's conflict appears
to lie in his commitment to federalism. In Harper v. State Board of
Elections,195 Stewart joined Justice Harlan's dissent, which is most sig-
nificant for its rejection of strict scrutiny of claimed equal protection
violations.' 96 The majority opinion, written by Justice Douglas, held
that equal protection was violated by making "the affluence of the voter
or payment of any fee an electoral standard."'' 97 This broad conclusion
was undoubtedly influenced by evidence in the record that the poll tax
189. 380 U.S. 145 (1965).
190. Lassiter v. Northampton Election Bd., 360 U.S. 45, 50-53 (1959).
191. Id. at 53.
192. Louisiana v. United States, 380 U.S. 145, 152-53 (1965); United States v. Missis-
sippi, 380 U.S. 128, 143-44 (1965).
193. Harper v. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
194. Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966); South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383
U.S. 301 (1966).
195. 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
196. Ad. at 670-80 (Harlan, J., dissenting, joined by Stewart, J.).
197. Id. at 666.
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was, in contemporary design and effect, a restriction on the black
franchise. 98 Although the Court found that the state's prerequisite of a
poll tax bore no relation to voter qualifications, it also indicated that
classifications restraining voting, a fundamental right must be "closely
scrutinized and carefully confined."' 199
Justices Harlan and Stewart rejected the implication that the Court
might require anything more of the states than that their electoral poli-
cies be rational. In their opinion the poll tax could be deemed rational
because "property qualifications and poll taxes have been a traditional
part of our political structure." 2" They viewed the near demise of the
poll tax as a sign of slowly evolving changes in concepts of equality.
20'
For Harlan and Stewart, however, this evolution was not a signal for
the Court to enshrine "political doctrines popularly accepted at a par-
ticular moment' 2 °2 as constitutional proscriptions. In contrast with the
pre-1966 cases, in Harper Harlan and Stewart found an explanation
other than racial discrimination for the poll tax: the tradition of requir-
ing property ownership, as evidence of one's "deeper stake in commu-
nity affairs, ' 20 3 to qualify for the franchise. Given the existence of this
alternate explanation for the poll tax, and their identification of the
disfavored parties as indigents rather than as racial minorities,2"
Harlan and Stewart opted for their usual presumption of state auton-
omy over elections.2 °5
Justice Stewart joined Justice Harlan's dissent again in Katzenbach
v. Morgan,2 °6 in which the majority upheld congressional power to en-
act provisions of the Voting Rights Act of 1965.207 The decision was
198. During oral argument it was pointed out by counsel for Harper that blacks were
distinctly more affected by the poll tax than were whites, but the Court's interest also ran to
questions about economic discrimination per se. 34 U.S.L.W. 3261 (U.S. Feb. 1, 1966).
199. 383 U.S. at 670.
200. Id. at 684 (Harlan, J., dissenting, joined by Stewart, J.).
201. By the mid-1960's only four states-Alabama, Texas, Mississippi and Virginia--still
imposed poll taxes as a prerequisite for voting. Id. at 666 n.4.
202. Id. at 686 (Harlan, J., dissenting, joined by Stewart, J.).
203. Id. at 683 (Harlan, J., dissenting, joined by Stewart, J.).
204. The Court has not subjected classifications based on indigency to strict scrutiny un-
less they also implicate a fundamental interest. Compare, e.g., San Antonio Independent
School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973) (relative, not absolute, deprivation of the bene-
fits of education because of wealth discrimination does not trigger strict scrutiny) with
Kramer v. Union Free School Dist., 395 U.S. 621 (1969) (state law limiting voting in school
elections to property owners or lessees, or parents of pupils, impinged on a fundamental
right, thus triggering strict scrutiny).
205. 383 U.S. at 680-86 (Harlan, J., dissenting, joined by Stewart, J.).
206. 384 U.S. 641 (1966).
207. The Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. § 1973-4(e) provides: "[N]o person who
has successfully completed the sixth primary grade in a [school] accredited by the Common-
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premised on the idea that voting is an area of primary competence of
the states not to be interfered with by Congress, nor overridden by the
judiciary, without very strong constitutional bases.2"8 In rejecting the
conclusion that Congress had legislative power to suspend English lan-
guage literacy tests,2"9 Harlan and Stewart viewed the test, like the poll
tax, as presumptively founded on some state rationale other than the
intent to discriminate.2"'
While it is no doubt possible that there is a relationship between
English language literacy and the ability to understand the ballot fully,
the dissenters may have exaggerated the precedential value of
Lassiter.2 1 Two anomalies may be discerned in their assumption that
Lassiter had held literacy tests constitutional and their implicit accusa-
tion that the majority in Morgan was guilty of ignoring this fact. First,
Lassiter was a narrow opinion: it held only that literacy tests were not
on their face unconstitutional as probative of voting qualifications.21 2
It is ironic that Justice Stewart, a proponent of the narrow, tentative
decision, should rely on precedent as broadly controlling. Second, the
challenge in Lassiter was made, by potential voters against the regis-
trars, directly on the constitutional guarantees of the Fourteenth and
Fifteenth Amendments.2" 3 In Morgan, however, at issue was the valid-
ity of a determination by Congress that section 4(e) of the Voting
Rights Act was needed to remedy equal protection violations by
states.214 Advocates of judicial restraint ordinarily draw a distinction
between the propriety of Court determinations of constitutional viola-
tions and the Court's passive acceptance of such decisions already
made by the Congress, evidencing a preference for the latter.215 Harlan
wealth of Puerto Rico in which the language of instruction was other than English shall be
denied the right to vote in any election because of his inability to read or write English."
208. 384 U.S. at 670-71 (Harlan, J., dissenting, joined by Stewart, J.).
209. The majority found this power in § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. U.S. CONST.
amend. XIV § 5. See note 21 supra.
210. The dissent emphasized the need for a judicial determination of unconstitutionality
of state voting regulations and clear-cut evidence of racial discrimination to support reme-
dial congressional action. 384 U.S. at 666-70 (Harlan, J., dissenting, joined by Stewart, J.).
211. See notes 186-92 and accompanying text supra.
212. It will be recalled that in Lassiter, the Court indicated it would invalidate such tests
if evidence showed they were propounded for the purpose of discrimination. Lassiter v.
Northhampton, 360 U.S. 45, 53 (1959).
213. Id. at 46.
214. 384 U.S. at 665.
215. The principle is that declaring a state practice unconstitutional is aposiive act of
judicial review, whereas upholding Congressional legislation prohibiting state practices
avoids active judicial review. For a judge who espouses the traditional restraint philosophy,
the distinction is an important one. See, e.g., Harper v. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 675-
80 (Black, J., dissenting).
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and Stewart seemed to view congressional acts regulating the franchise
as more destructive of federalism than similar pronouncements by the
federal courts directly under the Constitution.2 16 It has already been
suggested that Stewart has not been an advocate of the "deference to
the legislature" school of jurisprudence.217 His position in Morgan
provides further support for this assertion.
In addition to viewing section 4(e) as an incursion into state au-
thority inimical to the federal system, the dissenters also argued that
the section violated separation of powers in that the legislature had en-
croached upon the judicial function. While acknowledging the power
of Congress to take corrective action under section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment when states have infringed on federally protected rights,
they maintained that "it is a judicial question whether the condition
with which Congress has thus sought to deal is in truth an infringement
of the Constitution, something that is the necessary prerequisite to
bringing the § 5 [of the 14th Amendment] power into play at all.
2 18
Why the determination of Fourteenth Amendment rights and viola-
tions is exclusively a judicial function, given the implicit delegation of
such power to Congress under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment,
is not satisfactorily explained by the Harlan and Stewart dissent. One
is left with the impression that they viewed intrusions into, or restric-
tions on, state authority as more questionable when perpetrated by
Congress, whose decisions may reflect interest group politics, than
when imposed by a federal court. The idea that judicial decisions, even
constitutional ones, are simply objective legal decisions is a pro-
nounced theme in Stewart's jurisprudence. It is evident in Morgan that
this view precluded trusting a political body like the Congress with the
power to override state laws on constitutional grounds. Stewart's feder-
alist principles with respect to the franchise and his satisfaction with
alternate, non-racist explanations for the alleged state discrimination in
Harper and Morgan explain his decisions to join Justice Harlan's dis-
sents against federal intrusions, legislative or judicial, into state voting
requirements.
A more curious anomaly, however, is Justice Stewart's vote with
the majority in South Carolina v. Katzenbach.21 9 South Carolina chal-
lenged the constitutionality of various provisions of the Voting Rights
216. 384 U.S. at 666-68 (Harlan, J., dissenting, joined by Stewart, J.).
217. See note 126 and accompanying text supra.
218. 384 U.S. at 666 (emphasis added).
219. 383 U.S. 301 (1966).
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Act,220 especially the suspension of tests and devices for voter registra-
tion in states in which voter turnout in 1964 was below 50% of the adult
residents.221 The provisions challenged in South Carolina seemed to
raise all of the serious federalist doubts Stewart had expressed through
Justice Harlan in the Morgan dissent.222 Moreover, the provisions
challenged in South Carolina were in a very real sense more directly
intrusive into state electoral procedures than was the provision attacked
in Morgan. The latter suspended the voter requirement of English lan-
guage literacy predicated upon Congress' finding that such a require-
ment was a violation of equal protection.223 In South Carolina,
however, the entire administrative machinery of the Voting Rights Act
was challenged, including the assignment of federal registrars and the
suspension of tests, whether for literacy or otherwise, in states desig-
nated by Congress to have been likely to have misused their authority
over voting qualifications. States were so designated on the basis of
statistical inferences, rather than upon judicial or even congressional
finding of unconstitutional practices. Thus, the federalist principle of
state autonomy over voting seemed far more seriously jeopardized by
the provisions of the Voting Rights Act challenged in South Carolina
than by those challenged in Morgan, yet Stewart dissented only in the
latter case.
One explanation for Justice Stewart's apparently contradictory be-
havior is that he was perhaps as concerned about judicial autonomy as
state autonomy. In Morgan, Harlan and Stewart criticized what they
220. Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. § 1973(b), c, d(b), e, g, k(a) (1976).
221. Id. § 4(b).
222. Justice Stewart's questions and statements during oral argument on South Carolina
suggested that the federalist concerns which were to lead him to dissent in Morgan would
have also prompted him to dissent in this case. He seemed most disturbed by what he
viewed as the misuse by Congress of its remedial power under § 2 of the Fifteenth Amend-
ment. U.S. CONST. amend. XV § 2. Implying that Congress may have infringed upon the
constitutionally-reserved power of the states, Stewart asked Attorney General Katzenbach,
"You're not suggesting that Congress could override the privilege against self-incrimination
though appropriate to Fifteenth Amendment enforcement?" 34 U.S.L.W. 3251 (U.S. Jan.
25, 1966). He also appeared concerned that the Act encroached on state authority over
voting without clear and appropriate relationship to Fifteenth Amendment principles. Be-
cause the law suspended literacy tests wherever they may have been a tool for racial discrim-
ination, Stewart feared the law would "[result in] the registration of illiterates," not a
purpose of the Fifteenth Amendment. 34 U.S.L.W. 3252 (U.S. Jan. 25, 1966). Similarly, he
expressed concern that the voting turnout in 1964 was the statistic used to presume the exist-
ence of discriminatory voter registration procedures, questioning whether low voter turnout
could reasonably be the basis for triggering the test suspension provisions of the law when
low voter turnout was not necessarily reflective of low voter registration levels, discrimina-
tory or otherwise. Id.
223. See note 214 and accompanying text supra.
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saw as a violation of separation of powers arising from a final determi-
nation by Congress, rather than the judiciary that an infringement of
equal protection had occurred.224 In South Carolina, Congress had
also made a constitutional determination, but there was room left for
judicial action. States covered by the Act's suspension of tests and de-
vices could resume their use if they could prove to a federal district
court that the tests had not been a tool for racial discrimination during
at least the previous five years.225 The burden of proof was placed en-
tirely on the state and the chances for success were quite limited given
the strong statistical presumption against the state, but there was never-
theless the opportunity to utilize objective judicial processes on the con-
stitutional issue. Judicial power would seem to be the only important
principle differentiating South Carolina from Morgan and reconciling
the apparent contradiction in Stewart's positions. The mere three
months between the South Carolina and Morgan decisions renders
Harlan's and Stewart's attempts to justify the apparent inconsistencies
in their position difficult to understand, on any other basis.226
Legal analysts have called the Voting Rights Act of 1965 "'an un-
precedented abridgement of the [states'] power to set voting qualifica-
tions.'- 227 The statute and its later amendments, however, have
become the most significant means of enfranchising blacks in the
South. In their revealing analysis of the effect of the passage and im-
plementation of the Voting Rights Act, Rodgers and Bullock under-
scored the political importance of the Court's having upheld the
constitutionality of the law challenged in the two 1966 cases.228
Justice Stewart at the Pivot
The third era of voting equality decisions, dating from the late
224. 384 U.S. at 665-71. See notes 213-17 and accompanying text supra.
225. 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1976).
226. Justice Harlan attempted to distinguish South Carolina in his 3forgan dissent. He
maintained that the provisions challenged in South Carolina were constitutional because
Congress had volumes of evidence about the use of tests and devices to deny blacks the vote
in contravention of the Fifteenth Amendment. Harlan suggested, however, that § 4(e), chal-
lenged in Morgan, was not based upon comparable congressional research. 384 U.S. at 667.
The constitutional significance of this argument is questionable. Once one peels away the
political explanations for § 4(e), it may be understood as reflecting Congress' belief that a
Puerto Rican, educated in American schools and literate in Spanish, should not be denied
equal voting privileges under the equal protection clause. Research equivalent to that show-
ing the discriminatory use of tests and devices is hardly relevant to § 4(e).
227. P. KURLAND, POLITICS, THE CONSTITUTION AND THE WARREN COURT at 35 (1970)
quoting C. PRITCHETT, THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION at 756 (2d ed. 1968).
228. H. RODGERS, JR., & C. BULLOCK III, LAW AND SOCIAL CHANGE: CIVIL RIGHTS
LAWS AND THEIR CONSEQUENCES ch. 2passim (1972).
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1960's to the present, has involved the Court in interpreting the mean-
ing of the provisions of the Voting Rights Act and the practices that
come under its purview. It is within this third group of racial equality
cases that the true significance of Justice Stewart's role as a pivotal,
sometimes swing voter may be seen. With only three exceptions,22 9 the
voting equality cases decided by the Court from 1967 through 1978
have involved interpretations of section 5 of the Voting Rights Act,
which prohibits designated states from altering their electoral systems
without the prior approval of the United States Attorney General.
230
During the last year of Chief Justice Warren's tenure on the Court,
two cases interpreting section 5 were decided. The more significant of
the two was Allen v. State Board of Elections,"' in which the Court
found section 5 applicable to a change from district elections for county
supervisors to at-large elections. The case was decided by a seven-to-
two vote, with Justice Black dissenting and Justice Harlan dissenting in
part, but the substance of the Court opinion was subscribed to com-
pletely by only five Justices. Justice Black thought section 5 unconsti-
tutional; 2 Justice Harlan thought it inapplicable to those cases at bar
in which the state had not altered its election practices. 233 Justices
Douglas and Marshall, concurring with the Court, wanted to enjoin the
states from holding elections under the at-large plans.234 The majority
opinion, written by Chief Justice Warren, granted only a declaratory
judgment upholding the necessity of submitting the new county electo-
ral systems to the U.S. Attorney General or the federal District Court
for the District of Columbia for a determination as to whether it would
engender voting discrimination. 235 The majority did not reach the mer-
229. Briscoe v. Bell, 432 U.S. 404 (1977); Connor v. Finch, 431 U.S. 407 (1977); and
Gaston County, N.C. v. United States, 395 U.S. 285 (1969).
230. 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1976). While Connor did not directly involve the Voting Rights
Act, both Gaston County and Briscoe involved interpretations of § 4 of the Voting Rights
Act. 42 U.S.C. § 1973. As in all of the sections of the paper, the data analyzed include all of
the cases considered before the end of the October Term 1977.
231. 393 U.S. 544 (1969). The Allen case consolidated four cases: Allen v. State Bd. of
Elections, Fairley v. Patterson, Bunton v. Patterson, and Whitley v. Williams. Allen was an
appeal from a decision by the Federal District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia the
other three cases appealed decisions of the Federal District Court for the Southern District
of Mississippi. The less significant case decided in the same year was Hadnott v. Amos, 394
U.S. 358 (1969), which held that Alabama had unlawfully disqualified independent candi-
dates, most of whom were black, from the ballot for alleged failure to comply with the state's
election laws.
232. 393 U.S. at 595-97 (Black, J., dissenting).
233. Id. at 591-93 (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
234. Id. at 594-95 (Marshall, J., concurring and dissenting, joined by Douglas, J.).
235. Id. at 571-72.
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its of the legality of the electoral changes, and the opinion therefore
bears the mark of the limited remedy principle, so characteristic of
Stewart. Justice Stewart's inclusion in the Allen majority may well
have been the harbinger of a pivotal position on the Court. With the
retirement of Chief Justice Warren and Justice Fortas and their re-
placement by Chief Justice Burger and Justice Blackmun, the seven
Justice coalition for a liberal reading of section 5 had dwindled to five,
two of whom in Allen had wanted even more far-reaching remedies. It
was within this Court and the Burger Court after the appointment of
Justices Powell and Rehnquist that Stewart's position frequently deter-
mined the Court's focus.
Since the appointment of Chief Justice Burger (and through the
spring of 1978) the Supreme Court has interpreted the Voting Rights
Act in fourteen cases. Ten of these decisions were non-unanimous and
six were decided by five vote majorities.236 Although both Justice
Stewart and Justice White appeared to swing from support for racial
equality under the Act to support for the autonomy of southern govern-
ments, Stewart's role as the pivotal vote is evident in the fact that he
has always been a member of the majority in these cases, while White
twice dissented.237 In fact, between 1969 and the spring of 1978, Stew-
art has been the only Justice to be in complete accord with the majority
opinion in all of the Voting Rights Act cases. Thus, in Perkins v. Mat-
thews, 238 the first Burger Court interpretation of section 5, Stewart was
part of a five Justice majority which included Justice Brennan, who
wrote for the Court, and Justices Douglas, Marshall and White. Jus-
tices Harlan and Black took the same positions they had held in Allen,
in this case with reference to the applicability of the Act to municipal
annexations. 23 9 Chief Justice Burger and Justice Blackmun filed a one-
sentence concurrence to the effect that Allen was controlling. 240 Simi-
larly, in Georgia v. United States,24' Richmond v. United States242 and
Beer v. United States243 Stewart's pivotal role may be inferred from the
bare five-vote approval of the substance of the Court's opinions. In
Georgia and Beer, Stewart wrote for the majority, in the former case
236. See Appendix D, cases 11-20, 22-25.
237. Justice White dissented in Georgia v. United States, 411 U.S. 556 (1973), and Beer
v. United States, 425 U.S. 130 (1976).
238. 400 U.S. 379 (1971).
239. Id. at 397-400 (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); id. at 401-09
(Black, J., dissenting).
240. Id. at 397 (Blackmun, J., concurring in the judgment, joined by Burger, C.J.).
241. 411 U.S. 526 (1973).
242. 422 U.S. 358 (1975).
243. 425 U.S. 130 (1976).
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holding section 5 applicable to reapportionment of the Georgia legisla-
ture2 ' and in the latter holding that section 5 bans only those electoral
changes more detrimental to racial equality than the preexisting
plan. 45 The Georgia decision had the approval of Justice Blackmun
and the consistently more liberal members of the Court: Justices
Douglas, Brennan and Marshall. Chief Justice Burger concurred on
the basis that Allen was controlling, but announced that he had reserva-
tions about the correctness of that decision.246 Thus, it appears that
Stewart's vote was critical, given Chief Justice Burger's lack of confi-
dence in the Allen precedent.
After nine years of consistent support for racial equality under the
Voting Rights Act of 1965, albeit usually by very slim majorities, the
Court in Richmond v. United States247 and Beer v. United States248
seemed to reverse this trend. Richmond, a five-to-three decision, held
that section 5 was not necessarily violated by the city's annexation of an
adjacent, primarily white area. If Justice Stewart had voted for a more
liberal reading of section 5, one which would prohibit boundary ma-
nipulations which reduce relative black voting strength, the resulting
four-to-four split would have meant affirmance of the district court de-
cision favoring the interests of the black community. Similarly, in Beer
v. United States,249 another five-to-three decision, the Court ruled that
section 5 did not apply to a New Orleans redistricting plan which re-
tained its former provision for two at-large city council seats and cre-
ated a distinct possibility that blacks could elect one or two council
members. The likely effect of the plan was that blacks would not be
able to gain sufficient seats on the council to ensure proportionate polit-
ical strength of the black community. Justice Stewart, writing for the
majority, relied on the allegedly enhanced voting power that blacks
would enjoy in at least one district to find that the redistricting did not
"'have the effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on account of
race or color.' "250 As noted by Justice Marshall, however, the redis-
tricting plainly would result in diluting the black vote by making it
possible for the city's 34.5% black voters to elect only one, or at best
two members of a seven-seat council.25' Again, as in Richmond, had
244. 411 U.S. at 531.
245. 425 U.S. at 141.
246. 411 U.S. at 541 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
247. 422 U.S. 358 (1975).
248. 425 U.S. 130 (1976).
249. 425 U.S. 130 (1976).
250. Id. at 142, quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1973(b).
251. Id. at 159-62 & n.19 (Marshall, J., dissenting, joined by Brennan, J.).
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Justice Stewart opted for a broader interpretation of section 5, the re-
sulting equal division of the Court, affirming the district court decision,
would have favored the interests of the black voters of New Orleans.
252
Given the critical nature of Justice Stewart's vote in Richmond and
Beer, the reasons underlying his change in position from a more liberal
perception of section 5, as evidenced by Allen,253 Georgia254 and Per-
kins,2 " to the more restricted scope discerned in the foregoing cases
bear examination. It appears significant that in Richmond the Court
for the first time had to evaluate the merits of the discrimination claim.
And in Beer the Court had to decide whether the practice challenged
was actually the kind of discrimination banned by the Voting Rights
Act. In contrast, Allen, Perkins and Georgia decided only that changes
to at-large elections, annexations and reapportionments, respectively,
in states covered by the Voting Rights Act must be submitted for the
approval of the attorney general or the district court for the District of
Columbia. Stewart's parting company with the liberals of the Allen,
Georgia and Perkins coalition was in all likelihood due to his willing-
ness in those cases to interpret broadly what matters must be submitted
for judicial and administrative scrutiny under section 5, and to his re-
luctance in Richmond and Beer to use section 5 substantively to enjoin
the annexation or reapportionment plans adopted by local government.
Generally, narrow procedural opinions, such as those on the Vot-
ing Rights Act prior to Richmond, need not commit a Justice to any
particular position on the merits of the substantive issue. Therefore,
there should be no presumption of inconsistency when a Justice decides
that a law is applicable to a particular situation but that the law has not
been violated. With respect to Justice Stewart's positions in Richmond
and Beer, however, there is an apparent departure from the principles
stated in his opinion for the Court in Georgia. In Georgia he had held
that the Attorney General could prevent a reapportionment scheme
252. Although Justices Burger and Blackmun also switched in their Noting from support
for the equality claim in Georgia to a position against equality in Richmond and Beer, their
votes with the Court decision in Georgia were based on the Allen precedent. Thus, it is
reasonable to view Stewart as the member of the Richmond and Beer majorities with the
weakest affinity for the unfavorable racial voting equality position of the Court in these later
cases. Justice White also changed positions from Georgia to Beer, but it was a change which
resulted in his remaining a dissenting vote; hence his voting is not a key variable in explain-
ing the Court's changed position in the latter case. It is note-worthy, however, that White
wrote the majority opinion in Richmond, a fact which raises intriguing questions as to his
differentiation between Richmond and Beer, but which are beyond the scope of this article.
253. See notes 231-35 and accompanying text supra.
254. See notes 244-46 and accompanying text supra.
255. See notes 238-40 and accompanying text supra.
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judged to "have the potential for diluting the value of the Negro vote"
irrespective of any intention by the state to discriminate.256 In Rich-
mond, however, black voting strength was clearly diluted when, after
annexation, the resident black population dropped from 52% to 42%,
and the lower court record was replete with evidence of discriminatory
intent as well as effect.257 Yet Stewart voted to reverse the district court
and joined Justice White's assertion that the city needed to prove only
that the annexation, post hoc, actually resulted in some benefit to the
city.258 Not only had voting dilution been proven in Richmond, but far
from not requiring a showing of discriminatory intent-as in Geor-
gia25 9-the Court actually forgave clear discriminatory intentions and
results.260 Also implicitly contrary to his dicta in Georgia,2 6 ' Stewart
joined in relieving the city of Richmond, to some extent, of its substan-
tial burden of proving that the proposed change was free of discrimina-
tory purpose or effect.262
In Beer, Justice Stewart appeared to shift the burden to the black
voters to demonstrate that a proposed redistricting plan was retrogres-
sive rather than ameliorative of racial disenfranchisement in order for
the court to apply section 5.263 Perhaps even more important is the idea
advanced in Beer that only those racial discriminations in voting which
are aggravated by change are banned by the Voting Rights Act. Previ-
ous to Beer, there had never been any suggestion but that objective
measures of black resident population, voter registration and potential
voting strength, rather than the existing state of discriminatory prac-
tices, were the relevant bases for determining dilution.
Justice Stewart thus appears to have been inconsistent in Rich-
mond and Beer, at least with respect to the implications of his dicta in
Georgia. In the narrow and strict sense, however, it is only Stewart's
256. 411 U.S. 526, 534 (1973).
257. 422 U.S. at 382-83 (Brennan, J., dissenting, joined by Douglas and Marshall, JJ.),
quoting Richmond v. United States, 376 F. Supp. 1344, 1349-50 (D.C. Va. 1974), vacatedand
remanded, 422 U.S. 358 (1975).
258. Id. at 373-74.
259. 411 U.S. at 536-38.
260. The district court in Richmond found that annexation had been enacted in 1969
with a discriminatory purpose and, therefore, the plan could not stand unless the city could
prove: (1) that it had some objectively verifiable, legitimate purpose for the annexation at
the time of adopting a ward city council election system in 1973; and (2) that the ward plan
effectively eliminated the dilution of black voting power caused by the annexation. 422 U.S.
at 372. The Supreme Court declined to approve these requirements. Id. at 374-75. See note
258 and accompanying text supra.
261. 411 U.S. at 536-39.
262. 422 U.S. at 380-81 (Brennan, J., dissenting, joined by Douglas and Marshall, JJ.).
263. 425 U.S. at 140-41.
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uniquely clear perception of the severability of questions of the appli-
cation of procedures mandated by the Voting Rights Act and findings
of a substantive violation of the Act that accounts for the pattern of the
Court's decisions in the section 5 cases. He was the only member of the
Court to subscribe fully to the liberal Court interpretations of the pro-
cedural reach of section 5 while also joining Court opinions which nar-
rowly defined what may be considered substantive breaches of the Act.
The voting analysis of these bare majority cases illustrates the critical
role Stewart has played in this area of litigation.
Conclusion
The evidence suggests that the southern fear of Justice Stewart's
appointment to the Supreme Court was perhaps a prophecy of the sig-
nificance of Stewart's involvement in racial equality cases. While
Stewart has never been the protector of racial equality-indeed during
most of the years of the Warren Court he was among the least support-
ive of racial equality-in later years, with changes in Court member-
ship, Stewart has become the pivotal vote on some important racial
issues. He clearly has become both a swing and a pivotal vote in school
desegregation decisions as evidenced by Emporia and Milliken. He has
also constituted the theoretical fifth vote on a number of state action
cases. The same pattern has emerged in cases on the Voting Rights
Act. In addition to the importance of Stewart's pivotal vote, his moder-
ate-philosophy has made an impact on Court decision-making. In de-
segregation and state action cases, his approach has been consistently
narrow and limited with respect to the issues, the decision and the rem-
edy. In cases concerning electoral equality he has also shown a com-
mitment to federalism. His restraint in constitutional decision-making
has, in many instances, resulted in a lack of predictability, not because
Stewart is especially inconsistent, but rather because short steps allow
one more freedom of movement in the future.
Justice Stewart has often appeared to be the member of the Court
most committed to the judicial canon of deciding no more than is nec-
essary in the instant case. The effects of this philosophy, however, are
not always desirable. Constitutional decisions based on the combina-
tion of specific circumstances of a case and the granting of a remedy
which is no broader than necessary-the kind of decisions for which
Stewart is largely responsible-have often created confusion and in-
consistency in the law and among judges of a magnitude that belies the
alleged virtues of this approach. Stewart's apparent "tomorrow is an-
other day and case" philosophy, as exemplified by his constitutional
JUSTICE STEWART-RACIAL EQUALITY
and statutory decisions concerning racial equality, has been a very sig-
nificant force within the Court during the last two decades. The signifi-
cance of his vote has changed with time and Court personnel, but his
centrist theoretical orientation, the substance of his moderate approach,
has remained a potent intellectual force on the Court. Since Justice
Stevens' appointment in 1975, the Court has appeared less prone to
near-even divisions on the promotion of racial equality. Stewart's vote
has, therefore, lost some of its pivotal quality. But it is quite likely that
his moderate approach to questions of racial equality will remain. On
the unanswered questions of racial equality upon which the Court may
desire a more united stance, it is Justice Stewart's approach to issues
that may well prove to be the foundation for greater consensus.
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